The authors respond to D. A. Helminiak's (2001) article "Treating Spiritual Issues in Secular Psychotherapy." They focus particularly on Helminiak's argument for secular spirituality (whether spirituality can be independent of theologyheligion) and his inherent biases in discussing the nature and existence of spirituality. The authors argue that all spiritual conceptions have theological implications-and thus a theology, broadly definedand that theology, in this sense, pervades the theory and practice of all psychotherapists, whether or not they are religious. W We are sympathetic to Helminiak's basic thrust "that spirituality is inherently relevant to psychotherapy" (p. 163) and agree that a formal conceptualization of spirituality is important to therapy. We view his article as advancing the dialogue about this conceptualization in provocative and productive ways.However, like any advance in a relatively new dialogue, this article raises as many issues as it resolves. We believe that one of the most difficult issues is spirituality's traditional tie to theology. Specifically, how "independent of, yet open to" religion (p. 163) is Helminiak's approach to spirituality? He contends that his notion of secular spirituality is universal and, thus, nonpartisan or neutral to all forms of spirituality. But, is it? Helminiak makes a valiant effort to attain universality and neutrality, but, as we will attempt to show, he ultimately champions a particular theology and, thus, a particular spirituality. His effort is so thorough, however, that it begs the broader question of whether spirituality can be independent of theology. Certainly, if spirituality cannot be independent of theology, then many of Helminiak's central propositions must be questioned.Our purpose, then, is to explore this issue more fully. We first ask the question, What does Helminiak mean by the independence of his spirituality conception from religion? Particularly, does such independence imply that his conception avoids positions and biases that are relevant to the existence and nature of God? To answer these questions, we first delineate the theoretical assumptions that underlie, but are not completely acknowledged, in Helminiak's conception. Then, we examine what implications, if any, these Brent D. Slife is a professor of psychology, and P. Scott Richards is a professor of counseling psychology, both at Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. Correspondence regarding this article should be sent to Brent