2018
DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2018.01.004
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Public goods games in populations with fluctuating size

Abstract: Abstract. Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended Wright-Fisher process with variable population size. In such a scenario, it is possible that the entire population becomes extinct. Survival of the population may depend on which strategy prevails in the game dynamics. Studying cooperative dilemmas, it is a natural … Show more

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Cited by 40 publications
(22 citation statements)
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“…Classical equations of ecology such as the co-evolutionary Lotka-Volterra dynamics have to be re-evaluated when finite populations are considered [33,72]. Recent studies explicitly include evolutionary game dynamics into an ecological framework [8,19,32,47,59,96]. In these models, one challenge is to re-interpret game interactions in terms of ecological dynamics so as to make sense in a fluctuating population size scenario.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Classical equations of ecology such as the co-evolutionary Lotka-Volterra dynamics have to be re-evaluated when finite populations are considered [33,72]. Recent studies explicitly include evolutionary game dynamics into an ecological framework [8,19,32,47,59,96]. In these models, one challenge is to re-interpret game interactions in terms of ecological dynamics so as to make sense in a fluctuating population size scenario.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…With approximations (20), (33), and (34), the exact system (9)-(10) becomes the following reaction-diffusion system…”
Section: Local Mean-field Approximationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Further progress in the field considered births and deaths: The second step of the dynamics, the one that allows a change of the strategy, is now interpreted as a death of a player followed by a birth. The new ecologic perspective allowed to assess the importance of new relevant issues, such as the fluctuation of the population density [17][18][19][20], the movement of agents [21][22][23][24][25], the spatial distribution of neighbours and their number [26,27], among others. Recent works also consider networks of interactions [7,12,[28][29][30][31][32], focus on the critical properties of the system [33][34][35], include other novel dynamic rules [36][37][38][39][40][41][42], analyze the formation of patterns [13,[43][44][45][46][47], and evaluate the effect on the population growing as external pressure rises [48].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, when placed in competition with other demes the niche acts as a common-pool resource, in other words it is nonexcludable and limited. Therefore, if 2 demes compete and extract from this common-pool resource, the one with the lowest allocation towards niche construction dominates, eventually pushing the other to extinction (23). The faster producer, in this case the deme free-riding on the constructed niche, wins in the struggle for existence.…”
Section: R a F Tmentioning
confidence: 99%