Public Information in Markov Games

Kloosterman, Andrew

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2528217

Cited by 10 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Following the approach of Kloosterman (), this asymmetric partnership game is modified with public signals. The set of signals is { b 1 , b 2 }, where b 1 is a signal that the beneficiary in the next period is player 1 and b 2 is a signal that the beneficiary in the next period is player 2.…”

Section: The Asymmetric Partnership Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Theorem 2 from Kloosterman () says that cutoff discount factor decreases as ɛ increases . This is illustrated here by observing that the left hand side of the incentive constraint for state ( N , n ) is increasing in ɛ and δ so if ɛ increases, the cutoff discount factor decreases.…”

Section: The Asymmetric Partnership Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Public information of this sort was introduced in a theory paper by Kloosterman (). The finding is that more informative signals (as defined by Blackwell ; Blackwell ) often decrease equilibrium payoffs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This can be shown to be a special case of Blackwell's criterion for informativeness as considered in Kloosterman ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Experimental Study of Public Information in the Asymmetric Partnership Game

Kloosterman¹

2018

Southern Economic Journal

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This article analyzes a laboratory experiment on the novel asymmetric partnership game with public information. In this game, two players jointly work on a project each period that only benefits one of them. The public signals are about who is likely to benefit in the future, and the main treatment variable is the informativeness of these signals. Behavior is shown to be best explained by a modification of the basin of attraction (as introduced in Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011) to allow for state-dependent beliefs. The public signals impact choices in the way that this theory predicts, and ultimately there is more effort when signals are more informative. Finally, a new way to investigate strategies in these types of games is considered, and it is shown that different states are used by subjects to use partial effort strategies.

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Section: The Asymmetric Partnership Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Asymmetric Partnership Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This can be shown to be a special case of Blackwell's criterion for informativeness as considered in Kloosterman ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Experimental Study of Public Information in the Asymmetric Partnership Game

Kloosterman¹

2018

Southern Economic Journal

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“…However, none of these papers address our question of whether monitoring can be too precise, in that worse observability can actually help sustain collusion. 7 A recent paper by Kloosterman (2015) also makes the point that more information can make cooperation harder in a Markov game. However, Kloosterman assumes perfect monitoring of actions and perfect information about the current physical environment and examines the impact of more precise public information regarding the next period's physical environment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Maintaining Privacy in Cartels

Sugaya

Wolitzky

2018

Journal of Political Economy

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It is conventional wisdom that transparency in cartels-monitoring of competitors' prices, sales, and profits-facilitates collusion. However, in several recent cases cartels have instead worked to preserve the privacy of their participants' actions and outcomes. Toward explaining this behavior, we show that cartels can sometimes sustain higher profits when actions and outcomes are observed only privately, because better information can hinder collusion by helping firms devise more profitable deviations from the collusive agreement. We provide conditions under which maintaining privacy is optimal for cartels that follow a marketsegmentation strategy.

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Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring

Kim¹

2018

Int J Game Theory

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This paper studies the impact of an improvement of information structure upon the perfect public equilibrium payoff set in discounted stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring. We first suggest three partial orders on information structures in stochastic games. Although each of them reduces to the notion of garbling in repeated games (Kandori in Rev Econ Stud 59:581-593, 1992), we find that an improvement of information in terms of our two garbling notions does not imply an expansion of the equilibrium payoff set for some games. We also show that more informativeness in terms of our third notion of garbling is sufficient for the expansion, thereby extending the well-known monotonicity result in Kandori (1992) to stochastic games. KeywordsStochastic game • Blackwell sufficiency • Information structure • Public monitoring • Perfect public equilibrium JEL Classification C72 • C73I owe many thanks to Ichiro Obara for his continuous guidance, encouragement, and invaluable advice. I am also grateful to a co-editor and two anonymous referees for insightful comments. All remaining errors are my own.

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Public Information in Markov Games

Cited by 10 publications

References 22 publications

An Experimental Study of Public Information in the Asymmetric Partnership Game

An Experimental Study of Public Information in the Asymmetric Partnership Game

Maintaining Privacy in Cartels

Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring

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