Public-Key Cryptography for RFID-Tags

Batina, Lejla; Guajardo, Jorge; Kerins, Tim; Mentens, Nele; Tuyls, Pim; Verbauwhede, Ingrid

doi:10.1109/percomw.2007.98

Cited by 171 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…The zero-knowledge property may be useful in an uncontrolled in-the-field code update, debug or test environment where the communication channel between the test server and JTAG is untrusted and the secret need not be shared or linked to a communicating entity. Moreover, Schnorr is a very established protocol, and is used in Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) protocols [16,17]. The related ECC-based Schnorr authentication protocol [13] is described in appendix A.…”

Section: Secure Test Authentication Based On Schnorr Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure JTAG Implementation Using Schnorr Protocol

et al. 2013

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Abstract.The standard IEEE 1149.1 (Test Access Port and Boundary-Scan Architecture, also known as JTAG port) provides a useful interface for embedded systems development, debug, and test. In an 1149.1-compatible integrated circuit, the JTAG port allows the circuit to be easily accessed from the external world, and even to control and observe the internal scan chains of the circuit. However, the JTAG port can be also exploited by attackers to mount several cryptographic attacks. In this paper we propose a novel architecture that implements a secure JTAG interface. Our JTAG scheme allows for mutual authentication between the device and the tester. In contrast to previous work, our scheme uses provably secure asymmetric-key based authentication and verification protocols. The complete scheme is implemented in hardware and integrated with the standard JTAG interface. Detailed area and timing results are also presented.

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Section: Secure Test Authentication Based On Schnorr Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

Secure JTAG Implementation Using Schnorr Protocol

et al. 2013

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“…There are some papers which propose to use PKC-based RFID systems [25], [22], [2], [11]. In [25] no specific authentication protocol is mentioned, and the Schnorr protocol [18] and the Okamoto protocol [16] are adopted in [22] and [2] respectively.…”

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [25] no specific authentication protocol is mentioned, and the Schnorr protocol [18] and the Okamoto protocol [16] are adopted in [22] and [2] respectively. However, it is shown that these two protocols are not proper for RFID systems due to their vulnerability against the tracking attack [11].…”

Section: Background and Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…EC-RAC was proposed to resolve these requirements but there have been reports (1) The authors are with the Department of Electrical EngineeringUniversity of California, Los Angeles, 56-125B Engineering IV Building 420 Westwood Plaza, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1594 USA (2) The authors are with the Department of Electrical Engineering -ESAT/SCD-COSIC, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, B-3001, Belgium.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Untraceable RFID authentication protocols: Revision of EC-RAC

Lee

Batina

Verbauwhede

2009

2009 IEEE International Conference on RFID

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Abstract-Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) systems are steadily becoming paramount due to their vast applications such as supply chains, inventory, tolling, baggage management, access control etc. While they have potentials to improve our lives, they also present a privacy risk. Privacy is often overlooked in many applications, but due to pervasiveness of RFIDs the issue has to be taken into account. However, additional security always comes at price and the scarceness of resources on a tag makes conventional privacy-preserving protocols infeasible.In this paper we propose several authentication protocols that are all made of the same building blocks. More precisely, we first revise the EC-RAC (Elliptic Curve Based Randomized Access Control) protocol and we expand it into several authentication protocols. All the proposed protocols satisfy the basic requirements, which are the system scalability, un-traceability and security against cloning attacks and replay attacks, but each protocol has different security properties. The security proofs are implied by means of cryptographic reductions, i.e. they are based on the security of the Schnorr protocol and the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem.

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“…Implementations must have a small footprint not to exceed the costs, and they have to be designed for low power in order to allow a certain reading range. A lot of proposals have been published so far that deal with lightweight cryptography for RFID by using coupon-based signature functions like GPS [23,18], stream ciphers [7,12,9], asymmetric algorithms like ECC [30,4], or symmetric algorithms like AES [10], PRESENT [6], SEA [28], HIGHT [13], or DES variants [22]. At the time, the security features of conventional RFID tags range from simple secure memory-lock functionalities to integrated cryptographic engines like Mifare [19], SecureRF [26], or CryptoRF [2].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

RFID and Its Vulnerability to Faults

Hutter

Schmidt

Plos

Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2008

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Abstract. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a rapidly upcoming technology that has become more and more important also in securityrelated applications. In this article, we discuss the impact of faults on this kind of devices. We have analyzed conventional passive RFID tags from different vendors operating in the High Frequency (HF) and Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) band. First, we consider faults that have been enforced globally affecting the entire RFID chip. We have induced faults caused by temporarily antenna tearing, electromagnetic interferences, and optical inductions. Second, we consider faults that have been caused locally using a focused laser beam. Our experiments have led us to the result that RFID tags are exceedingly vulnerable to faults during the writing of data that is stored into the internal memory. We show that it is possible to prevent the writing of this data as well as to allow the writing of faulty values. In both cases, tags confirm the operation to be successful. We conclude that fault analysis poses a serious threat in this context and has to be considered if cryptographic primitives are embedded into low-cost RFID tags.

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Public-Key Cryptography for RFID-Tags

Cited by 171 publications

References 17 publications

Secure JTAG Implementation Using Schnorr Protocol

Secure JTAG Implementation Using Schnorr Protocol

Untraceable RFID authentication protocols: Revision of EC-RAC

RFID and Its Vulnerability to Faults

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