Public Reason and the Moral Foundation of Liberalism

Abstract

I argue against Rawls’s freestanding conception of liberalism. On my view, the moral foundation of liberalism can be defended in one of three ways: (1) as a conception one accepts as a result of one’s affirmation of political liberalism, (2) as a conception one must affirm as a presupposition for political liberalism, or (3) as a philosophical truth about practical reason and persons. The first option makes it impossible to distinguish a moral consensus from a modus vivendi. The second renders the moral foundation of liberalism dogmatic because it affirms a moral foundation for which no justification is provided. Since there are good reasons for rejecting (1) and (2), that leaves option (3). I argue that (3) should be the preferred option for liberals who advance liberalism as a political doctrine with a moral foundation.

Kant e Rawls: uma análise dos pressupostos morais do liberalismo político

“…lARMORE, 2008, p. 139). Além do mais, pode-se mencionar, entre outros, os seguintes casos: Estlund (1998); Hampton (1996); wenar (1995) e Mahoney (2007). não tem qualquer vinculação com a concepção moral kantiana (RAwlS, 2011, p. 117-120).…”

Stability and Congruence in Political Liberalism: The Promise of an Ideal of Civic Friendship

“…Many commentators have found Rawls' revised argument for stability wanting for a variety of reasons: (1) some claim that the justificatory work performed by the overlapping consensus is already presumed by the definition of reasonableness used by Rawls (Barry, ; Habermas, ; Krause, , p. 371; Wenar, ); (2) others argue that the above justificatory strategy cannot show conclusively that citizens will give normative priority to political values over their comprehensive values in cases of conflict (Freyenhagen, ; Mahoney, ); (3) still others argue that the current argument for stability leads to incompleteness of public reason as it severely restricts the common ground shared by citizens (Quong, ). The first type of criticism denies the importance of congruence altogether for Rawls' revised theory.…”

“…For example, see Gaus, ; Krause, ; Mahoney, ; Mendus, . For an argument as to why this is not necessary, see Quong, .…”