Public service bargains in Dutch top civil service

Steen, Trui; Meer, F.M. van der

doi:10.1177/0952076710380766

Cited by 25 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Beyond the foundation supplied by Hood and Lodge (2006), these ideas have received fairly limited testing . Ideal‐type PSB categories have been found rare in practice, with overlap and hybridization common (Bourgault and Van Dorpe ; Steen and Van der Meer ). The terms of PSBs can also be ambiguous, which can be used strategically by bargaining actors (Burns, Wei, and Peters ).…”

Section: Public Service Bargainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict between Explicit and Tacit Public Service Bargains in U.K. Executive Agencies

Elston

2016

Governance

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Public service bargains (PSBs) define rewards, competencies, and loyalties for civil servants. They involve both explicit and tacit agreements with politicians. The article suggests that these two kinds of bargain may not be closely coordinated with one another, and can become "loosely coupled," operating and evolving with relative independence. This is particularly likely when there is conflict between rational-actor preferences and institutional expectations about political-administrative behavior. Such a trade-off can be managed by "decoupling" the explicit and tacit PSB, so that they operate differently in public and in private. Loose coupling results in inconsistent PSBs that are resistant to change, whereas decoupling highlights the compliance costs that actors face when securing cultural legitimacy for their bargains. These arguments are illustrated by the long-term development of "Next Steps" agencies in the United Kingdom, where a marked disjuncture has emerged between the stated and practiced PSB.

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Section: Public Service Bargainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conflict between Explicit and Tacit Public Service Bargains in U.K. Executive Agencies

Elston

2016

Governance

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“…Other publications based on the same research have shown that the initial PSB, which was in place before the public management reform movement in each country, still has an important impact on the current PSB (Bourgault, 2011;de Visscher et al, 2011a;Hansen and Salomonsen, 2011;Steen and Van der Meer, 2011;Van Dorpe and Horton, 2011).…”

Section: Conclusion: How Strong Is the Managerial Psb?mentioning

confidence: 94%

Performance management systems for senior civil servants: how strong is the managerial public service bargain?

Hondeghem

Dorpe

2013

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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During the past couple of decades we have witnessed important reforms in the public sector in OECD countries. Various forms of performance management systems have been introduced. This had an impact on the role and position of senior civil servants. The traditional public service bargain (PSB) came under pressure and was replaced byat least partially -a managerial PSB. This article looks at the performance management systems that have been introduced for senior civil servants in five countries (Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium) and their impact on the managerial PSB. When there is strong result-based control in the different phases of the performance management cycle, we assume a strong managerial PSB. The finding is that the Anglo-Saxon countries have stronger result-based control systems than the European continental countries. Therefore we conclude that in the former countries the managerial PSBs are stronger than in the latter countries. Points for practitionersPerformance management systems for senior civil servants show a different degree of result-based control. Following the four steps in a control process (plan, do, check, act) we can divide the performance management cycle into four phases: planning, monitoring, evaluation, and acting. When there is strong result-based control in each stage, we can speak of a strong managerial public service bargain (PSB). When there is moderate or weak result-based control, there is a moderate or weak managerial PSB, respectively. Each country can make its own choices regarding the performance management system

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“…Following Hood and Lodge's account of shifts in PSBs in the UK and Germany, the concept has recently been tested in Belgian, Canadian, Danish, Dutch, New Zealand and UK state administration (Bourgault, 2011;De Visscher et al, 2011;Hansen and Salomonsen, 2011;Lodge and Gill, 2011;Steen and van der Meer, 2011;Van Dorpe and Horton, 2011). This research provided a moderate picture.…”

Section: The Public Service Bargain Of the Top Civil Servantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The performance agreements lack a clear managerial spirit because of their soft nature and lack of harsh consequences in case of disappointing results. As a result, characteristics of a traditional reward system -such as elements of permanence, career progression and generous pay -persist alongside the new managerial traits (Steen and van der Meer, 2011). The responsibilities that Secretaries-General have are quite demanding since they are in charge of leading all ministerial tasks and responsibilities.…”

Section: The Public Service Bargain Of the Top Civil Servantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Autonomy is limited through efforts to enhance political control, and because of increased functional mobility having eroded the power base of top civil servants. At the same time, the managerial focus is supportive of a more proactive role of top civil servants (Steen and van der Meer, 2011). As a result, the Dutch bargain is a hybrid one, rather than exclusively managerial.…”

Section: The Public Service Bargain Of the Top Civil Servantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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New Public Management, Public Service Bargains and the challenges of interdepartmental coordination: a comparative analysis of top civil servants in state administration

Hansen

Steen

Jong

2013

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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In this article we are interested in how the coordinating role of top civil servants is related to the argument that country-level differences in the adoption of New Public Management significantly alter the Public Service Bargains of top civil servants and consequently their capacity to accomplish interdepartmental coordination. A managerial PSB limits top civil servants’ role in interdepartmental coordination, as their focus will be on achieving goals set for their specific departments, rather than for the central government as a collective. We test our argument with empirical insights from a comparative analysis of five countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. We find that our argument is only partly valid and discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of the analysis. Points for practitioners Alongside the introduction of New Public Management, the relationships between ministers and their top civil servants in state administration have evolved. At the same time, societal issues are getting more complex and demand a holistic, cross-sector approach. The concept of a managerial Public Service Bargain is used to analyze changes in top civil servants’ role and the impact of reforms on the capacity of top civil servants to accomplish interdepartmental coordination. Practitioners can learn more about the close link between challenges for interdepartmental coordination and changes in the role and functioning of top civil servants.

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Public service bargains in Dutch top civil service

Cited by 25 publications

References 7 publications

Conflict between Explicit and Tacit Public Service Bargains in U.K. Executive Agencies

Conflict between Explicit and Tacit Public Service Bargains in U.K. Executive Agencies

Performance management systems for senior civil servants: how strong is the managerial public service bargain?

New Public Management, Public Service Bargains and the challenges of interdepartmental coordination: a comparative analysis of top civil servants in state administration

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