In this article the position, role and functioning of the highest ranking officials in the Dutch civil service is discussed, using the theory of public service bargains (PSBs) as outlined by Hood and Lodge (2006). For the notion of a shift in PSB to be studied, we need a clear view on the initial PSB. We therefore first describe Dutch society and politics and the type of bargain traditionally found in Dutch public service, and briefly consider the reforms which might have had an impact on the PSB. Next, we analyse the key aspects of the current PSB. These include elements of reward, competency, and loyalty and responsibility. The current PSB is assessed in terms of Hood’s typology. While embedded in the specificities and history of the Dutch political—administrative system, a number of elements point to a shift towards a managerial bargain. As a result, we find a new, hybrid PSB to have emerged.

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Dutch society takes pride in its egalitarian character, and political and administrative officeholders are neither separated off nor placed on a pedestal. This general attitude originates in the predominantly middle‐class nature of Dutch society, in which the idea of formal incorporation of top civil servants in a separate class of administrative personnel is foreign; however, at the same time, there is a striving for unity in the national administration. The issue of tension between unity and fragmentation forces an assessment in this chapter of current developments in the higher civil service in comparison with the situation as it existed from the Second World War up to the early 1990s, with the emphasis on developments in the past two decades in which the most important event was the formation of a Senior Public Service (the Algemene Bestuursdienst, or ABD) after 1 July 1995. The first main section of the chapter (section II) examines what is meant by a ‘senior civil service’ in the Dutch context, where even the creation of the ABD does not provide a conclusive answer, since there are many senior civil servants outside it. In order to address this issue, the characteristics of the Dutch personnel management system are examined, and a brief outline given of the ABD and of the number of top civil servants working at central government level in the period 1976–1995. Section III turns to the political–administrative organization and the consultative structures at the top of the central government departments, and discusses the structure of the ABD, while section IV discusses the political affiliation (politicization) of top civil servants, and section V looks at functional mobility at the top, with special attention to the functional motives for creating the ABD. Finally, the social political structure of the civil service is reviewed, with sections on social (VI) and educational (VII) background.

Competency management has only recently been introduced into personnel management in Dutch central government. The decentralized nature of Dutch central government and its personnel management systems generates marked variation in the degree to which competency management is being applied across the Dutch civil service. The success or otherwise of competency management schemes in both government departments and the higher civil service in The Netherlands, the Senior Public Service, show mixed results. Although all departments have taken steps in the direction of competency management, a few well-developed programmes are in use. The competency management system of the Senior Public Service, then, serves as a basic tool for its management development programmes. Its aim is to enhance civil service professionalism among senior civil servants. The practical effects of competency management programmes, however, can be questioned. Because competency management links personnel development to pay and career decisions, it could well elicit strategic behaviour by staff members; at worst, it could run the risk of becoming a self-defeating initiative. INTRODUCTIONOver the last two decades, the Dutch Department of the Interior and other central government department personnel units have produced what looks at first sight to be an impressive stream of policy documents. These stress the need for large-scale investment in the people -the human resourcesemployed by government. The result of all this paperwork has been a wide range of human resource management (HRM) initiatives and pilot schemes. With varying degrees of success, departments and agencies have been experimenting with, among other things, management development, employability schemes and a wide range of training programmes. Nevertheless, some cynicism has gradually crept in over the value added by these HRM policies and programmes. The absence of evidence of clear changes in management practises and real effects on the work floor, together with complaints about the added paperwork such schemes bring with them, are commonly cited as the drawbacks of this style of personnel policy. In addition, the rapid replacement of 'old' by 'new' HRM instruments before they have been properly assessed has also served to weaken confidence in them. Such