Public Support for the European Parliament*

Abstract

The study of the European Parliament (EP) is motivated in large part by its central role in the democratic legitimacy of the European Union (EU). Public support for the EP is important to this legitimacy. At a fundamental level, a parliament designed to represent citizens ought to enjoy public respect and support and, in this study, I examine whether EU citizens vary systematically in their support for the EP. Based on regression analysis of Eurobarometer survey data, I demonstrate that EU citizens differ in their support for the EP based on their considerations of the current scope of EU governance, their appraisal of EU membership, their sense of European political identity, and their level of satisfaction with national democracy. These results have implications for how institutional reforms may shape public support for and the legitimacy of the EU.

The Role of Political Efficacy on Public Opinion in the European Union

“…Gabel, ; Scharpf, ). Moreover, these studies are typically premised on an assumption that the EU lacks a single identifiable ‘demos’ and that its legitimacy is based largely on the ability of the EU to enhance an individual's (or Member State's) economic wellbeing (Eichenberg and Dalton, ; Gabel, ; Scharpf, ). Within this model, support for the EU reflects the output‐based mechanisms underlying Easton's utilitarian mode of support and is likely to be less durable and not based on a more abstract ‘reservoir of favourable attitudes’, as is expected to be the case in national‐level systems.…”

“…However, few subsequent studies have sought to directly develop this finding further. Instead, the explanations of EU support that have dominated the literature include (1) a performance‐based model where economic benefits, or perceptions thereof, improve public opinion towards the EU (Anderson and Reichert, ; Gabel, ); (2) a procedural‐based cuing model where voters use their understanding of the quality of national‐level institutions to shape attitudes towards the EU (Anderson, ; Hobolt, ; Rohschneider and Clark, 2009; Rohrschneider, ; Sanchez‐Cuenca, ); and (3) a perceived cultural threat model where antipathy towards the EU is driven by hostility towards or fear of other cultures (Hobolt et al ., ; Lubbers and Scheepers, , Lubbers et al ., ; McLaren, ). In addition, further studies have indicated that levels of political knowledge can have a mediating effect on these predictors (Hobolt, ; Janssen, ; Karp et al ., ).…”

The Legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from Recent General Assembly Debates

“…Our approach is different from quantitative research on legitimacy, which frequently relies on Easton's concept of diffuse support as “generalized attachment” to an institution independent of disaffection toward specific procedures, policies, or officials (Easton :444). Such studies employ survey analysis to assess public attitudes toward international institutions (Caldeira and Gibson ; Gabel ). In contrast to this, we examine evaluative statements by UN member states on the Security Council in GA debates.…”

Determinants of the Formation of a European Identity among Children: Individual‐ and School‐Level Influences

“…Functionalist scholars, for example, claim that citizens decide whether to identify with the EU based on a cost–benefit analysis – that is, an individual will calculate whether the EU benefits them overall, after taking into account the costs. This decision is then regarded as a result of instrumentalist/utilitarian logic (Haas, 1958; Gabel, 1998, 2003; Kritzinger, 2005). On the other hand, social constructivists claim that these collective identities – of which European identity is an example – are socially constructed; this means that they are intentionally or unintentionally the result of social interactions that occur between individuals.…”