Putnam's Model‐Theoretic Argument against Metaphysical Realism

Hale, Bob; Wright, Crispin

doi:10.1002/9781118972090.ch27

Cited by 10 publications

(10 citation statements)

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“…There is a strong case to be made that radical interpretation is impossible, and hence that the a priori argument for Semantic Supervenience fails. Though the possibility of radical interpretation has been questioned previously (Hale & Wright, 1997;Field, 1978;Putnam, 1980;Quine, 1960;Williams, 2007), there is an obstacle to radical interpretation that has hitherto gone unnoticed: the aggregation problem.…”

Section: _____________mentioning

confidence: 99%

Radical Interpretation and The Aggregation Problem

Hattiangadi

2019

Philos Phenomenol Research

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This paper takes issue with Lewis' influential argument for the supervenience of the semantic on the nonsemantic based on the possibility of radical interpretation. Radical interpretation is possible only if an ideal being, who is omniscient about the non-semantic truths, can deduce the semantic truths a priori. The radical interpreter appeals to a set of criteria of interpretation choice, such as most notably some kind of Principle of Charity. It is argued in this paper that the radical interpreter faces an insoluble aggregation problem: the radical interpreter must jointly apply several criteria for evaluating interpretations in order to determine which interpretation is best overall. First, the situation of the radical interpreter is formally modeled using the machinery of social choice theory. Second, it is argued that either Arrow's impossibility theorem or a variant of it applies to the situation of the radical interpreter. The upshot is that radical interpretation is impossible, and Lewis' argument for semantic supervenience fails. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 1 There are many ways to characterise supervenience more precisely. For an overview, see McLaughlin and Bennett (2014). A more precise characterisation is given in §2.

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confidence: 99%

Radical Interpretation and The Aggregation Problem

Hattiangadi

2019

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…Referential indeterminacy arguments can be tailored to suit richer languages as well. See Chapter 2 of Putnam (1981) and Hale and Wright (1997). 13 We assume that where the terms are variables the definition relativizes to an assignment s of values to the variables: m,s σ φ(v 1 , .…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Referential indeterminacy arguments can be tailored to suit richer languages as well. See Chapter 2 of Putnam () and Hale and Wright ().…”

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“…1414For details see Hale and Wright (). Taking for granted that truth per se is to be modeled by truth‐in‐a‐model applies equally to arguments that proceed by construction of deviant interpretations that are arguably simpler than the intended one and to arguments that conceive of alternative semantic properties and relations that differ from one another in their patterns of instantiation.…”

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Metasemantics and Singular Reference*

Simchen

2015

Nous

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“…For detailed expositions and discussion of Putnam's model-theoretic arguments, see for exampleHale and Wright (1997),Douven (1999),Dummett (2015), Taylor (2006 and Button (2013: chapter 2).…”

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The Indeterminacy of the Distinction between Objects and Ways of Being

Rizzo

2020

Erkenn

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Few if any distinctions are more easily recognisable and assented to than that between objects, that is, things which are some ways, and that which they are, that is, ways for objects to be (‘ways of being’ for short). In this paper I present an argument designed to show that this distinction is indeterminate in the sense that the truth-conditions of predicational sentences leave open what should count as an object and a way of being. The bulk of the argument is inspired by the celebrated permutation argument advanced by Quine, Wallace, Putnam and others.

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Putnam's Model‐Theoretic Argument against Metaphysical Realism

Cited by 10 publications

References 30 publications

Radical Interpretation and The Aggregation Problem

Radical Interpretation and The Aggregation Problem

Metasemantics and Singular Reference*

The Indeterminacy of the Distinction between Objects and Ways of Being

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