Putting Pluralism in its Place

Asay, Jamin

doi:10.1111/phpr.12303

Cited by 31 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…We begin by identifying a version of pluralism that we treat as our preferred version. next, we introduce a problem that pluralism apparently faces, developed by Asay (2016). We then show how this problem can be overcome.…”

Section: Alethic Pluralism?mentioning

confidence: 98%

Truth and Dependence

Tallant¹,

Ingram²

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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Section: Alethic Pluralism?mentioning

confidence: 98%

Truth and Dependence

Tallant¹,

Ingram²

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…The final primitivist theory of truth that we'll examine is that of Jamin Asay. Over an extensive body of work, Asay (2013a, b, c, 2014, 2016, 2021a, b) has developed the most thorough and nuanced defense of primitivism to date. Traditionally, primitivism has been seen as a rival of one of the most popular approaches to truth, known as deflationism .…”

Section: The History Of Primitivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Primitivist theories of truth: Their history and prospects

Wyatt¹

2022

Philosophy Compass

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Primitivists about truth maintain that truth cannot be analysed in more fundamental terms. Defences of primitivism date back to the early years of analytic philosophy, being offered by G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Gottlob Frege. In more recent years, a number of contemporary philosophers-including Donald Davidson, Ernest Sosa, Trenton Merricks, Douglas Patterson, and Jamin Asay-have followed suit, defending their own versions of primitivism. I'll begin by offering a brief history of primitivism, situating each of these views within the landscape of primitivist truth theories and detailing some of their core motivations and apparent shortcomings. To close the discussion, I'll offer a diagnosis of the prospects of primitivism, focusing on the mystery challenge, which has loomed large throughout the history of primitivist truth theories, and the methodology that should be used in evaluating primitivist (and other) truth theories going forward.

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“…12ff;1998b, p. 201), 4 I will leave this issue aside here because it lies beyond the scope of this paper and is anyway irrelevant to the points that will be made. Apart from this issue, there are two main motivations for pluralism (Asay, 2018;Bar-On & Simmons, 2018;Pedersen, 2012). 5 The first motivation stems from the so-called 'scope problem' (Edwards 2011(Edwards , 2018Lynch, 2009, ch.…”

Section: Alethic Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alethic pluralism and truthmaker theory

Akiba

2022

Theoria

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According to alethic pluralism, sentences belonging to different domains of discourse can be true by having different alethic (i.e., truth‐constituting) properties. Against this pluralistic view, Jamin Asay has recently argued that pluralists' appeal to multiple alethic properties is ill‐motivated because the main advantages of pluralism can already be obtained within the framework of standard truthmaker theory. In response to this objection, this paper argues that Asay's claim does not hold with respect to one of the central advantages of pluralism, namely, the ability to offer a proper understanding of the realism/anti‐realism debate. This is because, first, when simply construed, truthmaker theory can only provide an inadequate understanding of the debate, and second, when construed in certain ways that allow it to avoid inadequacy, it becomes committed to multiple alethic properties.

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Putting Pluralism in its Place

Cited by 31 publications

References 47 publications

Truth and Dependence

Truth and Dependence

Primitivist theories of truth: Their history and prospects

Alethic pluralism and truthmaker theory

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