Putting Powers Back on Multi-Track

Williams, Neil E.

doi:10.1007/s11406-010-9293-2

Cited by 29 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…See footnote 26 for a view that doesn't. 33 Two paradigm papers concerning multi-track powers are Lowe (2010), arguing against them, and Williams (2011), arguing for them. 34 This ignores what we should to say about the goodness of a power which does not manifest because it is not in the right conditions.…”

Section: Power-ing Up Neo-aristotelian Natural Goodnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Power-ing up neo-aristotelian natural goodness

Page

2021

Philos Stud

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Something is good insofar as it achieves its end, so says a neo-Aristotelian view of goodness. Powers/dispositions are paradigm cases of entities that have an end, so say many metaphysicians. A question therefore arises, namely, can one account for neo-Aristotelian goodness in terms of an ontology of powers? This is what I shall begin to explore in this paper. I will first provide a brief explication of both neo-Aristotelian goodness and the metaphysics of powers, before turning to investigate whether one can give an account of neo-Aristotelian goodness in terms of powers. I will suggest that the answer to this question is yes.

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Section: Power-ing Up Neo-aristotelian Natural Goodnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Power-ing up neo-aristotelian natural goodness

Page

2021

Philos Stud

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“…That a power is multi-track is controversial. Despite efforts by some to argue that all powers are single-track (e.g., Lowe, 2010; Molnar, 2003), compelling arguments have been offered for taking at least some of them to be multi-track (e.g., Williams, 2011; Vetter, 2013). I will not rehearse those arguments here.…”

Section: Why Deny the Identity Of Powers With Dispositions?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Disentangling Dispositions from Powers

Buckareff

2021

Dialogue

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Many powers-realists assume that the powers of objects are identical with the dispositions of objects and, hence, that ‘power’ and ‘disposition’ are interchangeable. In this article, I aim to disentangle dispositions from powers with the goal of getting a better sense of how powers and dispositions relate to one another. I present and defend a modest realism about dispositions built upon a standard strong realism about powers. I argue that each correct disposition-ascription we can make of an object is made true by the manifestations towards which a given power or collection of powers of the object is directed.

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“…Namely, we do not need to decide whether the possession of a powerful quality confers upon a bearer only one power or more (for a more detailed discussion on multi-track powers, see : Bird 2007a, pp. 21-24;Williams 2011;Vetter 2013). An example will elucidate the notion of a dispositional aspect.…”

Section: Two Senses Of Dispositionality and Qualitativitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Identity Theory of Powers Revised

Giannotti

2019

Erkenn

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Dispositionality and qualitativity are key notions to describe the world that we inhabit. Dispositionality is a matter of what a thing is disposed to do in certain circumstances. Qualitativity is a matter of how a thing is like. According to the Identity Theory of powers, every fundamental property is at once dispositional and qualitative, or a powerful quality. Canonically, the Identity Theory holds a contentious identity claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. In the literature, this view faces a contradiction objection that undermines its merits. We should therefore consider an alternative version that does not embrace the identity claim. My aim is to show that we can enjoy the benefits of the Identity Theory without embracing the identity between the dispositional and the qualitative. I shall argue that a distinction between two senses of dispositionality and qualitativity serves the purpose. I will then discuss three readings of the identity claim that can be formulated in light of such a distinction. I will conclude that even if the identity were to fail in any of the suggested readings, it would be possible to hold an account of fundamental powerful qualities.

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Putting Powers Back on Multi-Track

Cited by 29 publications

References 6 publications

Power-ing up neo-aristotelian natural goodness

Power-ing up neo-aristotelian natural goodness

Disentangling Dispositions from Powers

The Identity Theory of Powers Revised

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