Putting Properties First

Abstract

This philosophical work is about the metaphysical preconditions of natural science. It develops and defends a new metaphysical theory of natural modality called ‘Modal Platonism’, which puts properties first in the metaphysical hierarchy. According to this theory, natural properties—such as mass and charge—are ontologically fundamental entities which ground the laws of nature and the dispositions of things. The theory differs from other ‘properties-first’ approaches in two main ways. First, it views properties as Platonic universals, which exist even if they are not instantiated. Second, the theory rejects the popular idea that properties are identical with, or essentially dependent upon, dispositions. Instead, Modal Platonism views properties as qualities which necessarily ground dispositions and other modal phenomena. This theory, it is argued, solves a range of puzzles regarding dispositions and laws. Given that natural modality is a necessary precondition for scientific enquiry, Modal Platonism promises to provide a plausible metaphysical framework for all natural science.

Is There a Metaphysically Robust Distinction between Natural and Artificial Dispositions?

“…It remains unclear, however, what benefits could outweigh this loss of ontological economy. It is worth flagging that there is a powers view embracing actualized and non-actualized properties (qua universals): this is power Platonism defended by, e.g., Tugby (2013Tugby ( , 2022. Perhaps, someone could extend the considerations for endorsing powers Platonism to artificial dispositions.…”