Putting WMD terrorism into perspective

Aptitude for Destruction: Volume 1: Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism

“…It is clear that PIRA learned in the process of transforming its organizational structures to address security needs (Jackson, 2005). It is similarly clear that Aum Shinrikyo learned in order to synthesize the sarin it used on the Tokyo subway (Parachini, 2005). But detecting a terrorist group's efforts to change before the changes are fully realized and used in an attack is much less straightforward.…”

“…Detecting one of these indicators could cue an analyst to significant changes in learning efforts within a known group and could even help to identify early indicators of malevolent activity within a group that has not yet been identified. In the PIRA case, for example, experimentation during the development of several different weapons resulted in explosions in remote areas where the group was conducting engineering and testing activities "A systematic understanding of (Jackson, 2005 emissions to environmental agencies; these were also signals that the group was learning, although they were not appreciated as such at the time (Parachini, 2005). Indicators of other types of learning-related activities could similarly be applied to different weapons or operational areas.…”

“…Subsequently, the group built up the knowledge needed and put the weapons to more effective use (Jackson, 2005). When Aum decided to produce and use biological weapons, an activity dramatically different from anything the group had done previously, its lack of the knowledge needed to absorb the technologies resulted in multiple failures (Parachini, 2005) .21…”

Development of an Algorithm for Calculating the ‘Risk’ of Terrorist-CBRN

“…Driven by inherent doubts about the quality and accuracy of U.S. intelligence reports, coupled with the fear of the terrible premise that preludes T-CBRN, many U.S. policy makers have taken no chances in the drafting of policies estimating the T-CBRN threat. The lack of the capability to perform clear, concise T-CBRN analysis, has compelled many policy makers to hedge against unknown factors by adopting safer positions and ascribing to likely exaggerated assessments of T-CBRN capability [5].…”

“…Adding further to the difficulty in performing accurate analyses is the sketchiness of the details that do exist. Fortunately, however, this lack of information also means that the events involving the use of CBRN weapons by radical-perpetrators are relatively rare [5].…”