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This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series.RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. R AND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.R ® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2007 RAND CorporationAll rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Cover design by Eileen Delson La Russo Photo by TSgt Cedric H. Rudisill, U.S. Air ForceThis research was sponsored by the United States Department of Homeland Security and was conducted under the auspices of the Homeland Security Program within RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment.iii PrefaceTechnical countermeasures are key components of national efforts to combat terrorist violence. Efforts to collect data about and disrupt terrorist activities through human intelligence and direct action, information gathering, and protective technologies complement technical countermeasures, helping to ensure that terrorists are identified, their ability to plan and stage attacks is limited, and, if those attacks occur, their impact is contained.Given the potential effect of such measures on the terrorists' capabilities, it is not surprising that they act to reduce or neutralize the impact of defensive technologies on their activities. In the event that the terrorists' counterefforts are successful, the value and protection provided by defensive technologies can be substantially reduced. Through case studies of terrorist struggles in a number of nations, this document analyzes the nature and impact of such terrorist counterefforts on the value of defensive technologies deployed against them.The information presented here should be of interest to homeland security policymakers in that it identifies potential weaknesses in defensive technology systems, thereby informing threat assessment and providing a basis for improving the design of future defensive technologies. It extends the RAND Corporation's ongoing research on terrorism and domestic security issues. Related RAND publications include the following: Brian A. Jackson, John C. Baker, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, John V. Parachini, and Horacio R. Trujillo, Aptitude for Destruction, • This monograph is one in a series of studies examining technological issues in terrorism and efforts to combat it. This series focuses on understanding how terrorist groups make technology choices and respond to the technologies deployed against them. This research was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Science an...

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In the 1990s, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the Tokyo subway, and the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City seemed to signal the emergence of a new trend in terrorism-mass casualty attacks. Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, two former U.S. National Security Council officials, recently argued that the new trend is waged by religious militants "who want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead," which is a variation on Brian Jenkins' frequently quoted observation that terrorists want a lot of people watching, but only a few people dead. 1 They argue, furthermore, that given the "motivations of groups seeking to produce mass casualties and the lowering of technological and engineering barriers to CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons] manufacture and use over time, there is a strong possibility that such attacks will be attempted." 2 This new breed of terrorists will be drawn to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or CBRN (hereafter referred to as unconventional weapons) because in their quest to maximize casualties such weapons "provide a premium on their investment." 3 This view of the new terrorism has led to a significant shift in U.S. counterterrorism policy with an increasing focus on the prospect of terrorist use of unconventional weapons.Part of the challenge in comparing mass casualty attacks and the motivations of the perpetrators involves sorting out the different incidents and the different perpetrators. The mixing of incidents involving these two different types of weapons material has created an inchoate sense of fear and a policy maelstrom. As a result, American counterterrorism policy may mistakenly focus too much on unconventional weapons attacks rather than mass casualty attacks regardless of the weapons material. Extrapolating from the consequences of incidents involving high explosives to potential incidents involving unconventional weapons leads to an exaggerated sense of the likelihood and consequences of a perceived newly emerging terrorist threat.

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