1989
DOI: 10.1177/0272989x8900900209
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Quality-adjusted Life Years, Utility Theory, and Healthy-years Equivalents

Abstract: Decisions about medical treatments and the settings of health programs are not purely technical, but also involve issues of value such as the evaluation of trade-offs between quality of life (morbidity) and quantity of life (mortality). The most commonly used measure of outcome in such cases is the quality-adjusted life year (QALY). The authors show that QALYs, being a health status index, do not stem directly from the individual's utility function and thus only partly reflect the individual's true preferences… Show more

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Cited by 382 publications
(160 citation statements)
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“…Criticism that decision making based on QALYs may not accurately reflect individual preferences is based on the presumption that ideally a QALY should be a vNM utility. In the interpretation of QALYs as vNM utilities, we abstract from the discussion whether the conditions that equate QALYs and vNM utilities are reasonable and it is simply assumed that the individual preference relations satisfy these conditions (for a critical evaluation of these condition see, for example, Mehrez and Gafni (1989), Loomes ~d McKenzie (1989)). …”
Section: Interpretations Of Qalysmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Criticism that decision making based on QALYs may not accurately reflect individual preferences is based on the presumption that ideally a QALY should be a vNM utility. In the interpretation of QALYs as vNM utilities, we abstract from the discussion whether the conditions that equate QALYs and vNM utilities are reasonable and it is simply assumed that the individual preference relations satisfy these conditions (for a critical evaluation of these condition see, for example, Mehrez and Gafni (1989), Loomes ~d McKenzie (1989)). …”
Section: Interpretations Of Qalysmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…8 Third, it has been argued elsewhere that widely used representations of individual preferences for health (such as QALYs) rely on fairly restrictive assumptions (e.g. Loomes and McKenzie, 1989;Mehrez and Gafni, 1989). Thus, the aim of this paper was to consider a framework in which information on individual preferences over health is not available, either for practical or ethical reasons, but in which sound decisions over the evaluation of population health could still be made.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They translate into our context two of the most well-known and employed techniques to measure the benefits of health interventions in cost-utility analyses. Those techniques were initially considered as polars, although some of their differences and similar aspects were addressed (e.g., Mehrez and Gafni, 1989;Culyer and Wagstaff, 1993;Gafni et al, 1993;Bleichrodt, 1995). We have seen in this paper that they share a solid common ground.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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