2008
DOI: 10.1111/j.1574-0862.2008.00297.x
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Quality control in nonstaple food markets: evidence from India

Abstract: Using original survey data collected on growers, traders, processors, markets, and village communities, we will compare the situation in four states: Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Orissa. We examine the way that information about crop attributes is conveyed (or not) along the value chain. We find that little information circulates about unobservable crop characteristics. Growers receive a price premium when they dry, grade, and pack their produce, but we find no evidence that information about cr… Show more

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Cited by 71 publications
(47 citation statements)
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“…Suppliers cannot access accurate information on the quality attributes of the product and buyers must deal with heterogeneous inputs of variable qualities while at the same time, being able to deliver a uniform and stable final product to consumer markets (Raynaud et al, 2005). Price uncertainty occurs when producers and buyers cannot access accurate information about the quality attributes of the product; thus, rather than reflecting the opportunity costs of production, the final price may simply reflect the relative strength of bargaining (Fafchamps et al, 2008;Kyeyamwa et al, 2008). Williamson (1985) has argued that in the case of environmental uncertainty and absent asset specificity, market governance is preferred because of its low cost and strong performance incentives.…”
Section: Transaction Costsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Suppliers cannot access accurate information on the quality attributes of the product and buyers must deal with heterogeneous inputs of variable qualities while at the same time, being able to deliver a uniform and stable final product to consumer markets (Raynaud et al, 2005). Price uncertainty occurs when producers and buyers cannot access accurate information about the quality attributes of the product; thus, rather than reflecting the opportunity costs of production, the final price may simply reflect the relative strength of bargaining (Fafchamps et al, 2008;Kyeyamwa et al, 2008). Williamson (1985) has argued that in the case of environmental uncertainty and absent asset specificity, market governance is preferred because of its low cost and strong performance incentives.…”
Section: Transaction Costsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, the long value chains typical of African agricultural markets mean that even if a quality premium is paid by the ultimate processors or consumers, farmers are unlikely to receive higher prices, particularly because aflatoxin contamination is an unobservable trait (Fafchamps, Hill, and Minten 2008). Establishing direct procurement relationships between farmers or farmer associations and processors will likely be necessary for farmers to benefit from higher prices (and thus for them to be motivated to improve their management of aflatoxin on-farm, where contamination typically begins).…”
Section: Potential and Limitations Of Market-based Approachesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One of the most effective ways to build trust is to increase the game chains and change the one-shot game to a repeated game, which is difficult to achieve in non-cooperative games. Fafchamps [40] believes that the low efficiency of information transmission and the feedback on the agricultural products value chain will lead to a decline in the quality and safety of agricultural products. If the information platform is constructed and optimized, both buyers and sellers will adopt positive methods to actively pursue long-term and stable cooperation.…”
Section: Research On the Cooperation Between Producers And Consumers mentioning
confidence: 99%