Quality Testing and Disclosure

Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings

“…B e fo re proceeding, let us briefly relate our study to papers by Dye (1985Dye ( , 1986, Farrell (1986), Fishman and Hagerty (1990), Grossman (1981), Grossman and Hart (1980), and Matthews and Postlewaite (1985), Milgrom (1981) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) which study how economic agents selectively disclose information for purposes of persuasion. A central result of these papers is that in equilibrium the a g e n t discloses all information, no matter how unfavorable it is.…”

Information Gatekeepers: Theory and Experimental Evidence

“…This formulation is elegant but unsuitable for an experiment. Finally, there is an older literature on games of persuasion (Matthews and Postlewaite (1985) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) among others) that studies the ex-ante incentives of firms to acquire verifiable information given the ex-post willingness to reveal it to consumers depending on its content.…”

“…At the beginning of each match, each subject in a pair was randomly assigned a role as either red or blue (from now on, we call them 'red adversary' and 'blue adversary' respectively). 7 The event was represented to the subject as an urn, red or blue, drawn by the computer with equal probability. A red urn contained two red balls and one blue ball.…”

Incentives to Acquire Information under Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure

“…Under exogenous asymmetric information, the information status of the possibly informed party may also be subject to asymmetric information. Along these lines, Matthews and Postlewaite (1985) and Shavell (1994) have studied negotiations under exogenously given asymmetric information where one of the parties may acquire information prior to sale. This is in contrast to endogenous asymmetric information due to the fact that, prior to negotiations, one of the parties has covertly invested to a¤ect the possible gain of the relationship.…”

“…In a setting of exogenous asymmetric information, Matthews and Postlewaite (1985) provide such a comparison in a reduced-form game that is consistent with a game in which the …rm is a monopoly price-setter. Their acquisition technology, however, deviates from the one studied by Lau and the present paper.…”