Quantifying the impact of noise on macroscopic organization of cooperation in spatial games

Du, Faqi; Fu, Feng

doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2013.06.008

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 161 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…But since cooperation is common not only between relatives, other mechanisms have also been identified, including various forms of reciprocity and group selection [8]. Network reciprocity in particular [9], has recently attracted considerable attention in the physics community, as it became clear that methods of nonequilibrium statistical physics [10][11][12][13] can inform relevantly on the outcome of evolutionary games on structured populations [14][15][16][17][18][19][20]. While the basic idea behind network reciprocity is simple -cooperators do better if they are surrounded by other cooperators -the manifestation of this fact and the phase transitions leading to it depend sensitively on the structure of the interaction network and the type of interactions [14], as well as on the number and type of competing strate- gies [21].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Binary birth-death dynamics and the expansion of cooperation by means of self-organized growth

Szolnoki

Antonioni

Tomassini

et al. 2014

EPL

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Natural selection favors the more successful individuals. This is the elementary premise that pervades common models of evolution. Under extreme conditions, however, the process may no longer be probabilistic. Those that meet certain conditions survive and may reproduce while others perish. By introducing the corresponding binary birth-death dynamics to spatial evolutionary games, we observe solutions that are fundamentally different from those reported previously based on imitation dynamics. Social dilemmas transform to collective enterprises, where the availability of free expansion ranges and limited exploitation possibilities dictates selforganized growth. Strategies that dominate are those that are collectively most apt in meeting the survival threshold, rather than those who succeed in exploiting others for unfair benefits. Revisiting Darwinian principles with the focus on survival rather than imitation thus reveals the most counterintuitive ways of reconciling cooperation with competition.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Binary birth-death dynamics and the expansion of cooperation by means of self-organized growth

Szolnoki

Antonioni

Tomassini

et al. 2014

EPL

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Interestingly, the present study shows that, in the context of the traditional VPD game for a fully populated network [10], the emergence of cyclic behaviour is biased by the use of the Fermi-Dirac distribution function (sigmoid) in the strategy adoption process. This sigmoid function is often employed to allow for irrational or unjustified decisions where agents occasionally copy the strategy of a worse or an equally performing neighbour [5,57,66,67,68]. We show that when agents make fully rational decisions such as only copying the strategy of better performing neighbours, the outcome changes drastically, making cyclic behaviour unsustainable in most cases.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mobility restores the mechanism which supports cooperation in the voluntary prisoner’s dilemma game

Cardinot¹,

O’Riordan²,

Griffith³

et al. 2019

New J. Phys.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is generally believed that in a situation where individual and collective interests are in conflict, the availability of optional participation is a key mechanism to maintain cooperation. Surprisingly, this effect is sensitive to the use of microscopic dynamics and can easily be broken when agents make a fully rational decision during their strategy updates. In the framework of the celebrated prisoner's dilemma game, we show that this discrepancy can be fixed automatically if we leave the strict and frequently artifact condition of a fully occupied interaction graph, and allow agents to change not just their strategies but also their positions according to their success. In this way, a diluted graph where agents may move offers a natural and alternative way to handle artifacts arising from the application of specific and sometimes awkward microscopic rules.

show abstract

“…Wang et al [5] argued that the strategy choice of players should be affected by all their neighbors rather than the most successful neighbor and proposed an adaptive strategy-adoption rule to imitate the real-world social influence. Du and Fu [23] thought noise may be present in individual strategy learning and compared the impact of noise on spatial organization of cooperation. Gruji et al [24] carried out comparative experiments and found that moody conditional cooperation is more supported than noninnovative game dynamics such as imitate-the-best or pairwise comparison rules.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolution of Cooperation with Moore Neighborhood and Self-Playing Rule

Ruan

Bin

Liu

et al. 2015

Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Evolutionary spatial game is a promising way to unravel the mystery of cooperation, and it has been well recognized that spatial structure could enable cooperation to persist. Schweitzer et al.’s lattice model provides an innovative method to solve the problem. In this paper, we conduct simulations using the same von Neumann neighborhood as in Schweitzer et al.’s study (2002) and observe the effect of initial population and lattice size on the evolution of cooperation. Then, we extend the model with a more complicated Moore neighborhood and self-playing rule for each central player. Simulation results not only provide new evidence for the persistence of cooperation in the evolution with spatial structures, but also investigate critical conditions for the spatial coexistence or the invasion of cooperators and defectors with the more complicated neighborhood.

show abstract

Quantifying the impact of noise on macroscopic organization of cooperation in spatial games

Cited by 8 publications

References 161 publications

Binary birth-death dynamics and the expansion of cooperation by means of self-organized growth

Binary birth-death dynamics and the expansion of cooperation by means of self-organized growth

Mobility restores the mechanism which supports cooperation in the voluntary prisoner’s dilemma game

Evolution of Cooperation with Moore Neighborhood and Self-Playing Rule

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About