Quantitative Analysis and Countermeasures Research of P2P Routing Attacks

Lu, Chuiwei; Li, Fang; Jun, Cheng; Niu, Bo; Li, Yong

doi:10.1109/iwisa.2010.5473277

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…The IP addresses of both nodes are exposed to each other, which creates another opportunity for abuse. Once the identity of the peer is revealed, further attacks can be carried out [ 96 ].…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Structured P2P systems (eg, P2P IHE [ 51 ], our proposed PHS architecture [ Figure 3 ], Chord, and Kademlia [ 35 ]) are vulnerable to poison attacks [ 95 ], although resource discovery is under the control of data structures (eg, DHT). In routing table poisoning , the poison attacker exploits the fact that each peer in a DHT-based P2P system maintains the routing tables of its neighbors [ 47 , 56 , 73 , 77 , 95 , 96 ]. Each entry in the table includes the neighbor’s identifier, IP address, and port number.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Security Engineering of Patient-Centered Health Care Information Systems in Peer-to-Peer Environments: Systematic Review

Yari¹,

Dehling²,

Kluge³

et al. 2021

J Med Internet Res

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Background Patient-centered health care information systems (PHSs) enable patients to take control and become knowledgeable about their own health, preferably in a secure environment. Current and emerging PHSs use either a centralized database, peer-to-peer (P2P) technology, or distributed ledger technology for PHS deployment. The evolving COVID-19 decentralized Bluetooth-based tracing systems are examples of disease-centric P2P PHSs. Although using P2P technology for the provision of PHSs can be flexible, scalable, resilient to a single point of failure, and inexpensive for patients, the use of health information on P2P networks poses major security issues as users must manage information security largely by themselves. Objective This study aims to identify the inherent security issues for PHS deployment in P2P networks and how they can be overcome. In addition, this study reviews different P2P architectures and proposes a suitable architecture for P2P PHS deployment. Methods A systematic literature review was conducted following PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) reporting guidelines. Thematic analysis was used for data analysis. We searched the following databases: IEEE Digital Library, PubMed, Science Direct, ACM Digital Library, Scopus, and Semantic Scholar. The search was conducted on articles published between 2008 and 2020. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System was used as a guide for rating security issues. Results Our findings are consolidated into 8 key security issues associated with PHS implementation and deployment on P2P networks and 7 factors promoting them. Moreover, we propose a suitable architecture for P2P PHSs and guidelines for the provision of PHSs while maintaining information security. Conclusions Despite the clear advantages of P2P PHSs, the absence of centralized controls and inconsistent views of the network on some P2P systems have profound adverse impacts in terms of security. The security issues identified in this study need to be addressed to increase patients’ intention to use PHSs on P2P networks by making them safe to use.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%