2014 IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science 2014
DOI: 10.1109/focs.2014.57
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Quantum Attacks on Classical Proof Systems: The Hardness of Quantum Rewinding

Abstract: Quantum zero-knowledge proofs and quantum proofs of knowledge are inherently difficult to analyze because their security analysis uses rewinding. Certain cases of quantum rewinding are handled by the results by Watrous (SIAM J Comput, 2009) and Unruh (Eurocrypt 2012), yet in general the problem remains elusive. We show that this is not only due to a lack of proof techniques: relative to an oracle, we show that classically secure proofs and proofs of knowledge are insecure in the quantum setting.More specifical… Show more

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Cited by 117 publications
(62 citation statements)
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“…However, its classical security proof requires certain techniques such as rewinding and reprogramming the random oracle which do not necessarily apply in the quantum setting. Quantum rewinding is possible in some restricted cases [33,36], but it has been shown to be insecure in general [1]. Further, since random oracles model hash functions which, in a real world implementation, could be evaluated in superposition by a quantum adversary, we require quantum random oracles which can be queried in superposition.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, its classical security proof requires certain techniques such as rewinding and reprogramming the random oracle which do not necessarily apply in the quantum setting. Quantum rewinding is possible in some restricted cases [33,36], but it has been shown to be insecure in general [1]. Further, since random oracles model hash functions which, in a real world implementation, could be evaluated in superposition by a quantum adversary, we require quantum random oracles which can be queried in superposition.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, measurements on an EPR state result in shared randomness which is guaranteed to be unknown to any eavesdropper. 11 In a similar vein, one can argue that the measurement outcomes of Alice and Bob while successfully playing the CHSH game cannot be known to any adversary even if this adversary has built the devices herself and is possibly still entangled with them.…”
Section: Device-independent Cryptographymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, [11] show limitations to this technique (so that, in fact-relative to an oracle-there exists classical protocols that are insecure against quantum adversaries). See also [85].…”
Section: Zero-knowledge Against Quantum Adversaries: "Quantum Rewinding"mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Unruh [159] has considered quantum proofs of knowledge, making use of the quantum rewinding lemma and a different rewinding technique to prove interesting results concerning this notion. Ambainis, Rosmanis, and Unruh [13] have proved limitations on the applicability of these rewinding techniques, which indeed appear to be rather limited when compared to their classical counterparts. In addition to the close quantum states problem (and its complement), there are a few other promise problems known to be complete for the class QSZK.…”
Section: Chapter Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%