Question–answer games

Ågotnes, Thomas; Benthem, Johan van; Ditmarsch, Hans van; Minica, Stefan

doi:10.3166/jancl.21.265-288

Cited by 11 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…In strategic interactions an optimal question need not be the most informative one, and different preferences may arise in different scenarios. See [2] for a further study of this connection.…”

Section: Further Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a Dynamic Logic of Questions

Benthem

Minica

2012

J Philos Logic

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Questions are triggers for explicit events of 'issue management'. We give a complete logic in dynamic-epistemic style for events of raising, refining, and resolving an issue, all in the presence of information flow through observation or communication. We explore extensions of the framework to multiagent scenarios and long-term temporal protocols. We sketch a comparison with some alternative accounts.

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Section: Further Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a Dynamic Logic of Questions

Benthem

Minica

2012

J Philos Logic

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“…This outcome relation was used in [4,3] to determine equilibria of similar incomplete information games, but where more complex formulas than mere variables could be 'revealed' (however, they could only be publicly announced). An issue for the relatist outcome relation is whether bisimilar game states (that therefore satisfy the same goals for all players) should be counted once or twice.…”

Section: Boolean Observation Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…An issue for the relatist outcome relation is whether bisimilar game states (that therefore satisfy the same goals for all players) should be counted once or twice. 3 On the one hand, if two game states are bisimilar this is justification / sufficient reason to rule out one of them, according to Laplace. On the other hand these bisimilar game states might have originated from playing strategy profiles (executing epistemic actions) in initial game states that were non-bisimilar.…”

Section: Boolean Observation Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

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Boolean Observation Games

Ditmarsch¹,

Simon²

2022

Preprint

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We introduce Boolean Observation Games, a subclass of multi-player finite strategic games with incomplete information and qualitative objectives. In Boolean observation games, each player is associated with a finite set of propositional variables of which only it can observe the value, and it controls whether and to whom it can reveal that value. It does not control the given, fixed, value of variables. Boolean observation games are a generalization of Boolean games, a well-studied subclass of strategic games but with complete information, and wherein each player controls the value of its variables.In Boolean observation games player goals describe multi-agent knowledge of variables. As in classical strategic games, players choose their strategies simultaneously and therefore observation games capture aspects of both imperfect and incomplete information. They require reasoning about sets of outcomes given sets of indistinguishable valuations of variables. What a Nash equilibrium is, depends on an outcome relation between such sets. We present various outcome relations, including a qualitative variant of ex-post equilibrium. We identify conditions under which, given an outcome relation, Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist. We also study the complexity of checking for the existence of Nash equilibria and of verifying if a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. We further study the subclass of Boolean observation games with 'knowing whether' goal formulas, for which the satisfaction does not depend on the value of variables. We show that each such Boolean observation game corresponds to a Boolean game and vice versa, by a different correspondence, and that both correspondences are precise in terms of existence of Nash equilibria.

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“…Our treatment of ParaIMI does not address the erotetic aspects of IMI, instead focuses on its strategic, dynamic and interactive aspects. There have been some formal attempts to achieve this task which goes back to Belnap and Steel [7,1,43,21,44]. Additionally, some formal approaches to classical IMI were also presented relatively recently [14,16,28].…”

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confidence: 99%

Towards Paraconsistent Inquiry

Baskent

2016

AJL

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In this paper, we discuss Hintikka’s theory of interrogative approach to inquiry with a focus on bracketing. First, we dispute the use of bracketing in the interrogative model of inquiry arguing that bracketing provides an indispensable component of an inquiry. Then, we suggest a formal system based on strategy logic and logic of paradox to describe the epistemic aspects of an inquiry, and obtain a naturally paraconsistent system. We then apply our framework to some cases to illustrate its use.

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Question–answer games

Cited by 11 publications

References 9 publications

Toward a Dynamic Logic of Questions

Toward a Dynamic Logic of Questions

Boolean Observation Games

Towards Paraconsistent Inquiry

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