Questioning the Security of Three Recent Authentication and Key Agreement Protocols

Rahmani, Amir Masoud; Mohammadi, Mokhtar; Rashidi, Shima; Lánský, Jan; Mildeová, Stanislava; Safkhani, Masoumeh; Kumari, Saru; Hosseinzadeh, Mehdi

doi:10.1109/access.2021.3094875

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 42 publications

(56 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The suggested protocol has some intriguing characteristics and is backed up by provable security, assuming that the adversary only has access to the messages sent via the public channel. On the other hand, any security protocol should be extensively analysed by the third parties prior to relaying the security of a real application on it [23]. In addition, the security of Yang et al's protocol in the face of a more powerful attacker, who may compromise long-term secret parameters or impact primitives' functionality, such as random generators, is currently unexplained.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

BCmECC: A Lightweight Blockchain-Based Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for Internet of Things

et al. 2021

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, targeting efficient authentication and key agreement in an IoT environment, we propose an Elliptic Curve Cryptography- (ECC) based lightweight authentication protocol called BCmECC which relies on a public blockchain to validate the users’ public key to provide desired security. We evaluate the security of the proposed protocol heuristically and validate it formally, which demonstratse the high level of the security. For the formal verification we used the widely accepted formal methods, i.e., BAN logic and the Scyther tool. In this paper we also analyse the security of recently proposed blockchain-based authentication protocols and show that this protocol does not provide the desired security against known session-specific temporary information attacks in which the adversary has access to the session’s ephemeral values and aims to retrieve the shared session key. In addition, the protocol lacks forward secrecy, in which an adversary with access to the server’s long-term secret key can retrieve the previous session keys, assuming that the adversary has already eavesdropped the transferred messages over a public channel in the target session. The proposed attacks are very efficient and their success probability is `1’, while the time complexity of each attack could be negligible. Besides, we show that BCmECC is secure against such attacks.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%