Qui ont été les privilégiés de Cooke ? : Perdants et gagnants de la réglementation des fonds propres

Abstract

Après la mise en application de Bâle I en 1990, plusieurs pays ont enregistré une réduction des prêts bancaires et une faible croissance générale de l'économie. Plusieurs observateurs ont attribué ce déclin à la mise en application de l'Accord. Cet article propose un retour en arrière sur ce débat, dans le but de déterminer les « gagnants » et les « perdants » de cet Accord. Deux questions fondamentales doivent être gardées à l'esprit. Tout d'abord, les restrictions sur l'endettement des banques via la réglementation des fonds propres entraînent-elles les banques à augmenter ou à réduire la prise de risque dans les portefeuilles ? D'autre part, quelle est l'interaction entre la réglementation des fonds propres pondérés en fonction des risques et la garantie des dépôts (et plus généralement le « filet de sécurité »). La réponse à ces deux questions permet d'évaluer l'efficacité de l'Accord de 1988 et ses conséquences en termes de répartition. Classification JEL : E44, G21, G28

The Impact of Regulatory Requirements on the Bank Loans Flows to Emerging Countries

“…It was not until the 2000s that the subject began to attract economist studies despite the important role played by Basel I in amplifying the 1997 crisis. Bisignano (2003); Buch & al. (2003) show that Basel I favored the short-term financing to emerging countries.…”

“…Basel I was characterized by simple categorization based on OECD membership countries which gave a wide margin of arbitration. Banks could hold risky assets without regulatory coverage such as short-term assets of OECD emerging countries (Bisignano, 2003). These arbitrages have fueled massive banking flows to emerging countries before the 1997 crisis.…”

Basel II and its Implications for Foreign Banks Financing Emerging Countries

“…Moreover, for other emerging countries the share of short-term banking resources was also clearly in excess of 50% in 2003 (Table 5). 4 BIS statistics show an increase of 134% in cross-frontier receivables from banks declaring to BIS, essentially Japanese and European banks, for Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand between December 1993, and June 1997 (Bisignano [2003]). To confirm the continuing high interest shown by foreign banks in loans to emerging countries, despite the break in 1997, let us look at their exposure per zone (BIS, Consolidated International Banking Statistics; Kaminsky [2004]).…”

“…Criticism has been levelled at the measurement of risk, the absence of techniques to reduce risks or again the inadequate incentive for banks to diversify their asset portfolios as well as they might 2 . In particular, the Cooke regulation seemingly does not promote the long-term financing of emerging countries, as foreign banks are strongly encouraged essentially to grant renewable short-term loans (Bisignano [2003]). This situation may have compromised the access of emerging countries to stable exterior sources of financing and consequently stymied prospects for quality development.…”