Race and Racial Cognition

Kelly, Daniel; Machery, Édouard; Mallon, Ron

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.003.0014

Cited by 32 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 99 publications

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“…In addition, studies have repeatedly found that individuals can harbor implicit racial biases that contradict their explicitly held racial attitudes of, for instance, tolerance and racial equality, or their sincerely professed egalitarian ideals. Moreover, those implicit racial biases have been shown to influence judgment and behavior in a number of ways, both in controlled experimental settings, and, only slightly more speculatively, in real‐world situations (for recent overviews of experimental work see Lane, Banaji, Nosek, and Greenwald 2007, Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, and Banaji 2009; for examples of implicit biases' likely influence on real‐world settings see Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003, Sabin, Nosek, Greenwald, and Rivara 2008, Price and Wolfers forthcoming; for more discussion see Kelly, Machery, and Mallon 2010). Returning to the contact hypothesis, Shook and Fazio (2008) provide experimental evidence that, in addition to reducing explicit racism, contact also reduces implicit biases in advantaged and in disadvantaged racial groups 8 .…”

Section: The Contact Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Getting Rid of Racism: Assessing Three Proposals in Light of Psychological Evidence

Kelly

Faucher²,

Machery³

2010

Journal of Social Philosophy

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Section: The Contact Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Getting Rid of Racism: Assessing Three Proposals in Light of Psychological Evidence

Kelly

Faucher²,

Machery³

2010

Journal of Social Philosophy

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“…In the United States this constructionist stance stems at least in part from what SC scholars perceive as an overemphasis on psychological explanations during the nineteen-fifties and nineteen-sixties (for this retreat from psychological and toward structural accounts of racialism see Jackson 1990;Steinberg 1995Steinberg , 2007). CEP's defenders argue that these concerns are misplaced and that their psychological approach is a useful and necessary supplement to constructionist accounts Faucher 2005a, Mallon andStitch 2000) and that a politically powerful antiracist agenda would be enhanced by recognizing the psychology behind racialism (Kelly, Machery and Mallon 2010;Machery, Faucher and Kelly 2010;Kelly, Faucher and Machery 2010;Mallon and Kelly 2012). …”

Section: Cep and The Cognitive Mechanism Underlying Racialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cross-cultural Research, Evolutionary Psychology, and Racialism: Problems and Prospects

Jackson¹

2016

Philosophy and Theory in Biology

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Philosophers defending evolutionary/cognitive accounts of racialism argue that cross-cultural psychological research has discovered similar patterns of racial reasoning around the globe. Such research, they hold, simultaneously supports the existence of an underlying cognitive mechanism for essentialist thinking while undercutting social constructionist accounts of racialism. I argue that they are mistaken for two reasons. First, evolutionary/cognitive researchers are unfamiliar with constructionist accounts of global racialism which explain similarities and differences in racialism. Second, evolutionary/cognitive accounts that make cross-cultural claims shoulder probative obligations for showing the independence of the cultures being compared, and these obligations have not been met. I argue that further evolutionary/cognitive research on racialism must account for constructionist models of global racialism while meeting the argumentative obligations of cross-cultural research.

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“…To make such an argument against the race concept in particular, one has to make the argument that racial identitarianism is particularly dangerous, as compared to other forms of social identity, and is so much so to overcome the moral problem with e.g., ethnocide. We will consider a major justification, expressed by racial eliminativists (Kelly, Machery, and Mallon, 2010). It is argued that racial identity and association is particularly invidious because, first, historically biological racial-based associationsas opposed to family, political, cultural, and religious-based oneshave been excessively destructive and because, second, contemporaneously they still are.…”

Section: Vi-d the Moral Critiques: Arguments Based On Racial Classifmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Nature of Race: the Genealogy of the Concept and the Biological Construct’s Contemporaneous Utility

Fuerst¹

2015

OBG

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Racial constructionists, anti-naturalists, and anti-realists have challenged users of the biological race concept to provide and defend, from the perspective of biology, biological philosophy, and ethics, a biologically informed concept of race. In this paper, an ontoepistemology of biology is developed. What it is, by this, to be "biological real" and "biologically meaningful" and to represent a "biological natural division" is explained. Early 18th century race concepts are discussed in detail and are shown to be both sensible and not greatly dissimilar to modern concepts. A general biological race concept (GBRC) is developed. It is explained what the GBRC does and does not entail and how this concept unifies the plethora of specific ones, past and present. Other race concepts as developed in the philosophical literature are discussed in relation to the GBRC. The sense in which races are both real and natural is explained. Racial essentialism of the relational sort is shown to be coherent. Next, the GBRC is discussed in relation to anthropological discourse. Traditional human racial classifications are defended from common criticisms: historical incoherence, arbitrariness, cluster discordance, etc. Whether or not these traditional human races could qualify as taxa subspeciesor even speciesis considered. It is argued that they could qualify as taxa subspecies by liberal readings of conventional standards. Further, it is pointed out that some species concepts potentially allow certain human populations to be designated as species. It is explained why, by conventional population genetic and statistical standards, genetic differences between major human racial groups are at least moderate. Behavioral genetic differences associated with human races are discussed in general and in specific. The matter of race differences in cognitive ability is briefly considered. Finally, the race concept is defended from various criticisms. First, logical and empirical critiques are dissected. These include: biological scientific, sociological, ontological, onto-epistemological, semantic, and teleological arguments. None are found to have any merit. Second, moral-based arguments are investigated in context to a general ethical frame and are counter-critiqued. Racial inequality, racial nepotism, and the "Racial Worldview" are discussed. What is dubbed the Anti-Racial Worldview is rejected on both empirical and moral grounds. Finally, an area of future investigationthe politics of the destruction of the race conceptis pointed to.

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Race and Racial Cognition

Cited by 32 publications

References 99 publications

Getting Rid of Racism: Assessing Three Proposals in Light of Psychological Evidence

Getting Rid of Racism: Assessing Three Proposals in Light of Psychological Evidence

Cross-cultural Research, Evolutionary Psychology, and Racialism: Problems and Prospects

The Nature of Race: the Genealogy of the Concept and the Biological Construct’s Contemporaneous Utility

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