Race, Redistricting, and Representation

Canon, David T.

doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226789088.001.0001

Cited by 342 publications

(37 citation statements)

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“…18 By comparison, Robert Scott, who also practiced the "politics of commonality" (Canon 1999) in his Virginia district, experienced demobilization among his white constituents. This pattern may reflect the "disenfranchisement" and "adverse" effect alleged by the plaintiffs in Meadows v. Moon, (1997) the U.S. district court decision that struck down Scott's district.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a country in which politics historically has been an important vehicle in the mobility (and "mainstreaming") of racial and ethnic groups, white and black constituents alike may equate minority officeholding with the advancement of a minority public policy agenda. (In reality, the link is more ambiguous and, as Canon [1999] demonstrates, involves fewer tradeoffs.) For white constituents, the perception that a black officeholder's chief priority is to "solidify, manage, and protect" (Morris 1992, 170) minority interests-and that minority interests and white interests are necessarily incompatible-may erode confidence in the utility of political involvement.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(Also, minority empowerment scholars have not extended their research to include black members of Congress, arguably the most prominent class of black officeholders). To date, analytical efforts have focused on the policy consequences of minority representation in Congress (Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996;Canon 1999;Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles 1999;Lublin 1997;Swain 1995;Whitby 1998). From this perspective, black electoral success is significant only insofar as it serves as a unique guarantor of continued influence on the legislative process.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Effect of Black Congressional Representation on Political Participation

2001

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T he election of African Americans to Congress is a primary achievement of the post-civil rights transition from protest to politics. I evaluate the link between black congressional representation and political engagement, as measured by voting participation. There are two related objectives: Construct a broader model of participation that takes into account a key component of the political environment since the civil rights era, and more fully appreciate the political significance of minority officeholding by considering its nonpolicy consequences. Using precinct data from eight midterm elections, I demonstrate that the election of blacks to Congress negatively affects white political involvement and only rarely increases political engagement among African Americans.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Effect of Black Congressional Representation on Political Participation

2001

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“…"Underrepresented in the House, women, blacks, and Hispanics appear motivated to take compensatory action, pursuing issues that are more likely to appear relevant to members of their group. In this way, they transcend district boundaries and represent the interests of a historically underrepresented constituency" (Hall 1996, 209; see also Canon 1999 andCramer Walsh 2002). While the concept of group identification offers a welcome respite from the charge of irrational legislative behavior, it leaves many questions unasked and unanswered.…”

Section: Explanatory Possibilities Of a Theory Of Racing-genderingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Congressional Enactments of Race–Gender: Toward a Theory of Raced–Gendered Institutions

2003

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I nvestigating reports of marginalization from Congresswomen of color, I examine legislative practices in the 103rd and 104th Congresses to illuminate dynamics that structure hierarchies on the basis of race and gender. I advance an account of racing-gendering as a political process that silences, stereotypes, enforces invisibility, excludes, and challenges the epistemic authority of Congresswomen of color. Racing-gendering constitutes a form of interested bias operating in Congress, which has important implications for understandings of the internal operations of political institutions, the policy priorities of Congresswomen of color, the substantive representation of historically underrepresented groups, and the practice of democracy in the United States.Political democracy depends not only on economic and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions. Bureaucratic agencies, legislative committees, and appellate courts are arenas for contending social forces, but they are also collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend values, norms, interests, identities, and beliefs. March and Olsen (1989) Our understanding of institutions is inextricably bound to the dominant individuals who populate them.Simon Rosenthal (2000) Being a woman in Congress is like being a fragile goldfish among the barracuda. Griffiths (1996) Actually, these years [1995][1996] are pretty typical of my political career. Racism has always been there, gender bias has always been there. The mean-spirited debate is probably the only thing that changed. But that didn't change the fundamentals of racism and sexism. That has always been a constant. Johnson (1997)

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“…(2) Despite Lloyd Bentsen's skepticism about their similarity, John Kennedy and Dan Quayle were both among the most unpredictable senators in the chamber at the beginning of their respective careers and both became more doctrinaire the longer they were in the Senate. (3) Canon (1999) argues that John Conyers (D-MI) and John Lewis (D-GA) are exemplars of different styles of representation. According to Canon, Conyers has been an outspoken advocate of African-American interests and has frequently offered particularistic legislation with no chance of passage.…”

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confidence: 99%

Unpredictable Voters in Ideal Point Estimation

Lauderdale

2010

Polit. anal.

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Ideal point estimators are typically based on an assumption that all legislators are equally responsive to modeled dimensions of legislative disagreement; however, particularistic constituency interests and idiosyncrasies of individual legislators introduce variation in the degree to which legislators cast votes predictably. I introduce a Bayesian heteroskedastic ideal point estimator and demonstrate by Monte Carlo simulation that it outperforms standard homoskedastic estimators at recovering the relative positions of legislators. In addition to providing a refinement of ideal point estimates, the heteroskedastic estimator recovers legislator-specific error variance parameters that describe the extent to which each legislator's voting behavior is not conditioned on the primary axes of disagreement in the legislature. Through applications to the roll call histories of the U.S. Congress, the E.U. Parliament, and the U.N. General Assembly, I demonstrate how to use the heteroskedastic estimator to study substantive questions related to legislative incentives for low-dimensional voting behavior as well as diagnose unmodeled dimensions and nonconstant ideal points.

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Race, Redistricting, and Representation

Cited by 342 publications

References 0 publications

The Effect of Black Congressional Representation on Political Participation

The Effect of Black Congressional Representation on Political Participation

Congressional Enactments of Race–Gender: Toward a Theory of Raced–Gendered Institutions

Unpredictable Voters in Ideal Point Estimation

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