Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility

A systematic literature review of “rape victims” versus “rape survivors”: Implications for theory, research, and practice

“…More research with underrepresented populations (e.g., non-heterosexual women, women of color, men) should be conducted to examine the generalizability of the foundational theories and of the findings of our systematic review. For example, research suggests that the victimhood of Black women who have been raped is perceived as less credible (e.g., Wyatt, 1992), less "real" (Estrich, 1987), less serious (Foley, Evancic, Karnik, King, & Parks, 1995), and more acceptable (Foley et al, 1995;LaFree, 1980;Ugwuegbu, 1979;Willis, 1992) compared to the rape-related victimization experiences of White women. By more closely examining such patterns of experience at the intersections of gender, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, and other social group memberships (i.e., intersectionality; Frye, 1983; also see Anzaldúa, 2007;Collins, 2000;Crenshaw, 1989.…”

Mock Juror Ratings of Guilt in Canada: Modern Racism and Ethnic Heritage

“…One area that has become especially salient in recent years is the study of prejudicial attitudes and juror perceptions of guilt and criminal sentencing in the United States (for a review of these studies see Pfeifer, 1990). A number of these laboratory studies have found that participants either: (1) rate black defendants guilty significantly more often than white defendants in both rape and murder cases, or (2) assign lengthier sentences to black defendants, especially when the rape or murder victim is white (see e.g., Bernard, 1979;Bullock, 1961;Field, 1979;Foley & Chamblin, 1982;Gleason & Harris, 1975;Gray & Ashmore, 1976;Johnson, 1985;Klein & Creech, 1982;Scroggs, 1976;Ugwuegbu, 1979). These disparate dispositional findings have been further supported by evaluations of legal and archival data indicating that black Americans are more likely than are white Americans to receive the death penalty in the United States (see e.g., Baldus, Pulaski, & Woodworth, 1986;Baldus, Woodworth, & Pulaski, 1985;Gerard & Terry, 1970;Howard, 1975;Paternoster, 1984;Wolfgang & Reidel, 1975;Zeisal, 1981).…”

Dudas sobre la duda razonable

“…Los casos a los que se aplican son muy variables ya que los efectos no son únicos sino que existe una interacción de variables. Por ejemplo, un acusado del mismo sexo merece sentencias más cortas (Stephan, 1974); hay una interacción entre sexo y raza del acusado, de la víctima y del Jurado (Ugwuegbu, 1979;Feild, 1978). Por todo ello concluimos en favor de la heterogeneidad en todo tipo de casuística porque es muy difícil predecir todas las posibles interacciones.…”