Radically Open Strategizing: How the Premium Cola Collective Takes Open Strategy to the Extreme

Abstract

Whereas prior research has investigated cases of partially open strategizing, this article explores the practices and outcomes of radically open strategizing. We draw on a case study of the German Premium Cola collective to explore how it translates its principles of radically open agenda setting, participation, and governance into strategizing practices. Our analysis reveals that this collective performs radically open strategizing practices of distributed agenda setting, substantial participation, and consensual decision-making, but also performs counterbalancing practices of centralized agenda setting, selective participation, and authoritative decision-making in order to cope with practical barriers posed by information and power asymmetries between members as well as information overload. We find that these practices enable the collective to legitimize its strategic decisions, develop a collective identity, and maintain member motivation over time. Based on these findings, we conclude that radically open strategizing is a feasible practice, with limitations arising from participants making selective use of open strategizing opportunities, rather than being excluded from them.

Zones of participation (and non-participation) in open strategy: Desirable, actual and undesirable

“…Beyond the reminder that strategy content, processes, and context cannot be divorced (Pettigrew, 1987), our study showed that open strategy is not limited to strategy formulation only. The currently held view is that open strategy is a matter of strategy formulation (Luedicke et al, 2017), with strategy implementation remaining the work of strategists (Whittington et al, 2011). What our study shows is how open strategy can involve both strategy formulation and implementation.…”

“…The inclusion of a more diverse set of actors can in fact surface a wider variety of issues, ideas, and perspectives of the proposed strategy (Burgelman, 1983;Mantere, 2008). These are known to lead to increased tensions (Mantere & Vaara, 2008;Ashforth & Reingen, 2014) or failure to participate from those the strategy opening was intended to involve (Luedicke, Husemann, Furnari, & Ladstaetter, 2017;Matzler et al, 2014). The entire strategy formulation process has thus not always been completely opened up and the strategy formulation continues to reside at the organization's strategic apex (Narayanan & Fahey, 1982;cf Luedicke et al, 2017).…”

Closing for the Benefit of Openness? The case of Wikimedia’s open strategy process

“…In order to establish such a check-and-balance system -which represents a core value of openness, namely to allow the possibility of non-violent and transparent change (Popper, 1966(Popper, [1944) -we strive to identify 'enabling types of bureaucracy' (Adler & Borys, 1996, p. 85). 'Enabling' in our reading implies that the rules, procedures and instructions codify 'routines so as to stabilize and diffuse new organizational capabilities' (Adler & Borys, 1996, p. 69) and that they are compatible with the normative requirements underlying open qualities: broad participation and collaboration of various internal and external stakeholders (Aten & Thomas, 2016;Dahlander & Piezunka, 2014), access to and sharing of various knowledge sources (Chesbrough, 2006;Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010) as well as transparent and collective decision-making practices (Luedicke et al, 2017).…”

Participation Research and Open Strategy

“…Recent studies have raised participation as one of the key issues of open strategy (Luedicke et al, 2017;Mack & Szulanski, 2017). However, participation has a longer tradition in strategy research (Laine & Vaara, 2015;Mantere & Vaara, 2008) from which open strategy could learn from and contribute to.…”