Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars

Abstract

During the nineteenth century, states routinely defeated insurgent foes+ Over the twentieth century, however, this pattern reversed itself, with states increasingly less likely to defeat insurgents or avoid meeting at least some of their demands+ What accounts for this pattern of outcomes in counterinsurgency~COIN! wars? We argue that increasing mechanization within state militaries after World War I is primarily responsible for this shift+ Unlike their nineteenth-century predecessors, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit information collection among local populations+ This not only complicates the process of sifting insurgents from noncombatants but increases the difficulty of selectively applying rewards and punishment among the fence-sitting population+ Modern militaries may therefore inadvertently fuel, rather than deter, insurgencies+ We test this argument with a new data set of 286 insurgencies~1800-2005! and a paired comparison of two U+S+ Army divisions in Iraq~2003-2004!+ We find that higher levels of mechanization, along with external support for insurgents and the counterinsurgent's status as an occupier, are associated with an increased probability of state defeat+ By contrast, we find only partial support for conventional power-and regime-based explanations, and no support for the view that rough terrain favors insurgent success+ With more than 300 insurgencies fought since 1800, the current "face" of battle in Iraq and Afghanistan is a familiar one+ Despite the recent burst of research investigating civil war onset and dynamics, however, less attention has been devoted to Author names are alphabetical+ We thank -Toft, along with three anonymous reviewers and the editors of IO, for helpful comments and conversations+ We also thank the soldiers and marines who agreed to be interviewed+ Sara Evans, Raymond Hicks, and Samantha Lomeli provided excellent research assistance+ We are also grateful for critical feedback on earlier versions from seminar participants at Columbia

Geographic determinants of indiscriminate violence in civil wars

“…An overview of these cases is given in Table 3. The GED analysis was restricted to cases of irregular war and identified through a dataset of insurgencies by Lyall and Wilson (2009). As mentioned previously, the wider coverage of the GED data comes at a price: initiators of violence are not coded, and the type of violence for the conflict events is not disaggregated into tactical categories.…”

“…While this distinction has been made before (see Mason and Krane, 1989), Kalyvas's (2006) widely cited study brought increased scholarly attention to the study of violence in civil wars, resulting in numerous publications (e.g. Condra and Shapiro, 2012;Downes, 2007;Lyall, 2009;Lyall and Wilson;.…”

“…Studies that seek to explain the effects of indiscriminate violence on the conflict process follow hypotheses of either alienation or deterrence resulting from the use of indiscriminate violence (Downes, 2007;Lyall, 2009;Lyall and Wilson, 2009;Linke et al, 2012). With an overwhelming focus on the conflict process leading to civilian victimization or civilian victimization affecting the conflict process, too little attention has been given to the exogenous determinants of the type of violence used in civil wars.…”

Peace building after Civil War: A Critical Survey of the Literature and Avenues for Future Research

“…Wallensteen (2015), Fortna (2009) and Lyall and Wilson (2009), have long argued that outrights victories have become increasingly rare in civil wars, and conclude that these outcomes have been replaced by negotiated compromises. Meanwhile, contrary to assumptions in the literature, emerging studies have shown that wars do not exclusively end with decisive outcomes such as victories or negotiated settlements but more often end under unclear circumstances in which fighting simply ceases or disappears (Kreutz, 2012).…”

Explaining the Development–Civil War Relationship

“…6 Without knowing where the rebels are, the state cannot take advantage of its initial military superiority (Kalyvas, 2006: 174;Leites and Wolf, 1970: 33). This is amply shown in the counterinsurgency literature, which points to information-gathering abilities as the most important determinant of counterinsurgent effectiveness (Lyall and Wilson, 2009;Lyall, 2010).…”