During the nineteenth century, states routinely defeated insurgent foes+ Over the twentieth century, however, this pattern reversed itself, with states increasingly less likely to defeat insurgents or avoid meeting at least some of their demands+ What accounts for this pattern of outcomes in counterinsurgency~COIN! wars? We argue that increasing mechanization within state militaries after World War I is primarily responsible for this shift+ Unlike their nineteenth-century predecessors, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit information collection among local populations+ This not only complicates the process of sifting insurgents from noncombatants but increases the difficulty of selectively applying rewards and punishment among the fence-sitting population+ Modern militaries may therefore inadvertently fuel, rather than deter, insurgencies+ We test this argument with a new data set of 286 insurgencies~1800-2005! and a paired comparison of two U+S+ Army divisions in Iraq~2003-2004!+ We find that higher levels of mechanization, along with external support for insurgents and the counterinsurgent's status as an occupier, are associated with an increased probability of state defeat+ By contrast, we find only partial support for conventional power-and regime-based explanations, and no support for the view that rough terrain favors insurgent success+ With more than 300 insurgencies fought since 1800, the current "face" of battle in Iraq and Afghanistan is a familiar one+ Despite the recent burst of research investigating civil war onset and dynamics, however, less attention has been devoted to Author names are alphabetical+ We thank -Toft, along with three anonymous reviewers and the editors of IO, for helpful comments and conversations+ We also thank the soldiers and marines who agreed to be interviewed+ Sara Evans, Raymond Hicks, and Samantha Lomeli provided excellent research assistance+ We are also grateful for critical feedback on earlier versions from seminar participants at Columbia

Together, these essays represent an attempt to break free from the parochial preferences of each service by examining Landpower within the frame of American grand strategy. The guiding question of the volume is not how the Army can maximize its share of next year's budget, but what purpose, ultimately, any instrument of Landpower serves, and what particular purposes the U.S. Army is likely to serve in the medium to long term. The volume is divided into four parts.

Scholars and media outlets that cover the U.S. Congress devote substantial attention to the rise in partisanship and polarization over the past few decades. The steady increases in partisanship and polarization coincide with a comparable decline in veteran representation in Congress. While there are many factors that influence a congressperson’s behavior, an understudied issue is whether these trends suggest that veterans are more likely to exhibit bipartisanship than their nonveteran colleagues. Using two different measures of bipartisanship, this article draws on data from 12 different Congresses to examine whether veterans are more likely to be bipartisan than nonveterans. Utilizing difference in means tests, the results provide only modest evidence that increasing veteran representation would lead to more bipartisanship when controlling for generational differences. This article suggests a research agenda to further assess these findings and discusses the implications of increasing veteran presence in Congress on civil–military relations.

Evidence of an actual or perceived gap in ideological beliefs between civilian and military communities informs current debates on the military and its relationship to broader society. The authors examine one cohort of the military and its members' perception of their own ideology in relation to their civilian counterparts using a 2009 survey of cadets at the United States Military Academy. The authors ascertain cadet perceptions of (1) cadet ideological leanings on individual and aggregate levels, (2) the ideological leanings of the civilian population, and (3) the civilian population's assessment of the military's ideological leanings. The authors attempt to discern whether or not this military subpopulation perceives itself as different from the rest of society. The authors find that while members of the Army's future officer corps perceive themselves as more conservative than their civilian peers and society writ large, as a group they hold rather moderate political views.

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