1999
DOI: 10.1162/003355399555918
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Rational Bias in Macroeconomic Forecasts

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3
2

Citation Types

13
171
2

Year Published

2008
2008
2019
2019

Publication Types

Select...
9
1

Relationship

0
10

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 281 publications
(186 citation statements)
references
References 11 publications
13
171
2
Order By: Relevance
“…Such forecast differentiation is likely to result in "extreme" forecasts, which may be a source of the cross-sectional heterogeneity of forecasts that we have observed in our empirical analysis. Attempts to differentiate forecasts, in turn, may reflect that forecasters are paid according to their relative forecasting success, as in the model suggested by Laster et al (1999). If so, forecast accuracy is not the only argument in forecasters' loss function, implying that the kind of asymmetric loss functions underlying the estimation approach developed by Elliott et al (2005) may not suffice to model how forecasters form their forecasts.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such forecast differentiation is likely to result in "extreme" forecasts, which may be a source of the cross-sectional heterogeneity of forecasts that we have observed in our empirical analysis. Attempts to differentiate forecasts, in turn, may reflect that forecasters are paid according to their relative forecasting success, as in the model suggested by Laster et al (1999). If so, forecast accuracy is not the only argument in forecasters' loss function, implying that the kind of asymmetric loss functions underlying the estimation approach developed by Elliott et al (2005) may not suffice to model how forecasters form their forecasts.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A set of possible issues that we do not address is that forecasters may face economic incentives to act strategically in the sense of balancing accuracy against con ‡icting aims, such as convincing the market that they are well-informed, or of attracting media attention (see, e.g., Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996), Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006)). It is possible that these factors may impinge di¤erently on the point forecasts and histograms.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A possibility that we have not addressed is that forecasters may face economic incentives not to report their true beliefs: see, e.g., Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996), Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006). Forecasters may act strategically in the sense that they balance their goal of minimizing forecast errors against con ‡icting aims, such as convincing the market that they are well-informed, or of attracting media attention.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%