Rationality, autonomy, and obedience to linguistic norms

Stovall, Preston

doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02609-z

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 57 publications

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“…Thus, if rule‐following is thought to be necessarily intentional then the topic loses its connection to representation and content. This is why philosophers like Sellars and his followers think of rule‐following in a non‐intentional manner, in terms of some sort of non‐agentive sensitivity to the rule's demands (Sellars, 1954 ; Stovall, 2021 ). One should therefore always try to get clear on whether the sort of rule‐following discussed is thought to be necessarily intentional or possibly non‐intentional.…”

Section: Part I: the Basic Issues From Wittgenstein To Kripkementioning

confidence: 99%

“Rule‐Following I: The Basic Issues”

Reiland

2023

Philosophy Compass

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Rule-following' is a name for a cluster of phenomena where we seem both guided and "normatively" constrained by something general in performing particular actions. Understanding the phenomenon is important because of its connection to meaning, representation, and content. This article gives an overview of the philosophical discussion of rule-following. Part I of this two-part contribution is devoted to the basic issues from Wittgenstein to Kripkenstein's skeptical paradox. Part II will be about recent answers to the skeptical paradox and Boghossian's and Wright's new puzzles.

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Section: Part I: the Basic Issues From Wittgenstein To Kripkementioning

confidence: 99%

“Rule‐Following I: The Basic Issues”

Reiland

2023

Philosophy Compass

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Sellars on Rational Agency as Presupposing Collective Attitudes

Koons

2020

Groups, Norms and Practices

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Normativity of meaning: An inferentialist argument

Shimamura,

Tiisala

2023

Synthese

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This paper presents a new argument to defend the normativity of meaning, specifically the thesis that there are no meanings without norms. The argument starts from the observation inferentialists have emphasized that incompatibility relations between sentences are a necessary part of meaning as it is understood. We motivate this approach by showing that the standard normativist strategy in the literature, which is developed in terms of veridical reference that may swing free from the speaker’s understanding, violates the ought-implies-can principle, but ours does not. In addition, our approach is superior because, unlike the dominant approach, it can be extended from declarative sentences to non-representational uses of language. In this paper, however, we only formulate the argument for the base case that involves incompatibility relations between declarative sentences. The goal is not to derive norms from something that is not normative, but to explicate the distinctive type of normativity that is built into meaning as it is understood by language-users. The explication proceeds in two steps. (1) For any sentence s a speaker understands, there is another sentence s’ that is (and is understood by the speaker as) incompatible with s. (2) In virtue of understanding this incompatibility of meanings, she ought not to be committed to both s and s’. This prohibition is not derived from instrumental practical reason, nor is it based on representational correctness, but its source is the incompatibility of meanings.

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Rationality, autonomy, and obedience to linguistic norms

Cited by 5 publications

References 57 publications

“Rule‐Following I: The Basic Issues”

“Rule‐Following I: The Basic Issues”

Sellars on Rational Agency as Presupposing Collective Attitudes

Normativity of meaning: An inferentialist argument

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