The growing interest in secure multi-party database applications has led to the widespread adoption of Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (bft) consensus protocols that can handle malicious attacks from byzantine replicas. Existing bft protocols permit byzantine replicas to equivocate their messages. As a result, they need f more replicas than Paxos-style protocols to prevent safety violations due to equivocation. This led to the design of trust-bft protocols, which require each replica to host an independent, trusted component.In this work, we analyze the design of existing trust-bft and make the following observations regarding these protocols: (i) they adopt weaker quorums, which prevents them from providing service in scenarios supported by their bft counterparts, (ii) they rely on the data persistence of trusted components at byzantine replicas, and (iii) they enforce sequential ordering of client requests.To resolve these challenges, we present solutions that facilitate the recovery of trust-bft protocols despite their weak quorums or data persistence dependence. Further, we present the design of lightweight, fast, and flexible protocols (FlexiTrust), which achieve up to 100% more throughput than their trust-bft counterparts.