Re-visiting the ‘black box’ of migration: state-intermediary co-production of regulatory spaces of labour migration

Abstract

It is now widely held that a variety of intermediary actors, including recruitment and staffing agencies, multinational corporations and local brokers, shape labour migration. This paper argues that in order to better understand the global circulation of labour it is necessary to explore the involvement of these actors in the production of the regulatory spaces through which migrant labour is brokered. Indeed, migration intermediaries do not only navigate borders on behalf of their migrant clients. Nor is 'the state' primarily a backdrop against which the understanding of the role of intermediaries may be developed. Instead, we argue, regulatory spaces of labour migration are made and remade through direct and indirect exchanges and interactions between intermediaries and state actors. Through an analysis of three moments of regulatory change in Sweden, the paper shows that such interaction does not take place in an even landscape but, rather, that the ability of migration intermediaries to influence the regulation of migration lies in the capacity to form close relationships or establish a powerful presence. A focus on the dynamic co-production of regulatory spaces by intermediaries and state actors, in our view, offers a more nuanced account of how labour migration currently is brokered and regulated.

Spatial shifts in migration governance: Public-private alliances in Swedish immigration administration

“…From this in-between position they sometimes influence immigration policy and practice directly, for example by engaging in dialogue with state actors (Hedberg and Olofsson, forthcoming), or contesting decisions by immigration authorities or the immigration system at large (Khan, 2019). Their influence can equally be indirect, for example when the exploitative practices of certain intermediary actors prompt stricter regulations (Axelsson et al., 2021). Similarly, scalar readings of migration governance tend to emphasise how certain responsibilities for immigration control have been placed on actors beyond the state.…”

The entanglement of employers and political elites in migration policymaking: the case of Brexit and the revival of UK horticulture’s guestworker scheme

“…In light of the evidence presented, we need to be careful not to think of migration policymaking as shaped by political elites or business interests but to see both political elites and business interests as intimately entangled within and co-producing labour migration policy (see also Axelsson et al, 2021;Hedberg and Olofsson, 2022). Pressure from employers for continued low-wage labour migration after Brexit has been strong and, in the food production sector at least, it has correlated with policy outcomes.…”

“…Beyond the UK, Menz (2011: 12) has observed that: 'European employer associations have rediscovered an appetite for labour migrants', and that 'governments are heeding calls for more liberalised approaches to managing economic migration'. Recent evidence from Sweden underlines this point, demonstrating very clearly how the regulatory spaces of labour migration are now being co-produced by both migration intermediaries (such as recruitment agencies and corporations) and state actors (Axelsson et al, 2021;Hedberg and Olofsson, 2022). Freeman's (1995) arguments, it appears, have gained relevance as the UK, among other developed states, has undergone a period of expansive immigration.…”

“…Very simply, and this is not something Consterdine (2015; would contest given her emphasis on 'party ideology', political elites tend to align with economic interests (and this is particularly true of the UK Conservative Party). In the process, the regulatory spaces of labour migration become co-produced by migration intermediaries and state actors (Axelsson et al, 2021;Hedberg and Olofsson, 2022). The key is capturing this co-production (on paper or in conversation) and linking the intimate entanglement of employers and political elites with actual policy outcomes.…”

“…Migration policy in this particular instance was co-produced both by political elites (Consterdine, 2015;Statham and Geddes, 2006) and by employers (Freeman, 1995;Somerville and Goodman, 2010). The former not only gave the latter the opportunity to make a case for low-wage labour migration to continue, they also ultimately introduced a new policy mechanism (the seasonal worker guestworker visa scheme) to enable this (see also Axelsson et al, 2021;Hedberg and Olofsson, 2022). 1 On 23 June 2016 the UK voted to leave the EU, with 'Leave' winning the referendum by 51.9% to 48.1% for 'Remain' (in total 17.4 million people voted to leave the EU, out of a population of 64.6 million).…”