Reactance Perturbation for Detecting and Identifying FDI Attacks in Power System State Estimation

Liu, Chensheng; Wu, Jing; Long, Chengnian; Kundur, Deepa

doi:10.1109/jstsp.2018.2846542

Cited by 88 publications

(91 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Arbitrary placement randomly selects a subset of lines to install D-FACTS devices [127]. Full placement is the most expensive method in which D-FACTS devices are installed on every transmission line [128]. However, the detection effectiveness of MTDs under these two placements is not considered.…”

Section: E Moving Target Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, these two methods must be constructed in the D-FACTS placements, which ensure the detection effectiveness, such as the max-rank placements. Second, the optimization-based operation takes both the economic cost and the detection effectiveness into account, in which the metric of detection effectiveness is maximized or taken as constraints [128], [130]. Finally, the hidden MTD operation method delicately selects D-FACTS setpoints such that all measurements remain the same after MTD is applied [134]- [136].…”

Section: E Moving Target Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

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Smart Grid Cyber-Physical Attack and Defense: A Review

2021

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Recent advances in the cyber-physical smart grid (CPSG) have enabled a broad range of new devices based on the information and communication technology (ICT). However, these ICT-enabled devices are susceptible to a growing threat of cyber-physical attacks. This paper performs a thorough review of the state-of-the-art cyber-physical security of the smart grid. By focusing on the physical layer of the CPSG, this paper provides an abstracted and unified state-space model, in which cyber-physical attack and defense models can be effectively generalized. The existing cyber-physical attacks are categorized in terms of their target components. We then discuss several operational and informational defense approaches that present the current state-of-the-art in the field, including moving target defense, watermarking, and datadriven approaches. Finally, we discuss challenges and future opportunities associated with the smart grid cyber-physical security. INDEX TERMS Cyber-physical power system, cyber-physical security, false data injection, dynamic watermarking, moving target defense.

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Section: E Moving Target Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: E Moving Target Defensementioning

confidence: 99%

Smart Grid Cyber-Physical Attack and Defense: A Review

2021

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“…Case 0: the conventional ACOPF is applied; Case 1: the proposed ACOPF model with 1 0   and 2 1   is used only to minimize the generation cost; Case 2: the proposed ACOPF model with 1 1000   and 2 1   is used to minimize the generation cost and the system loss. We identify the maximum line power flow using the conventional ACOPF under the default load in MATPOWER, denoted by to be consistent with the D-FACTS setting in [6].…”

Section: Case Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

An Interior-Point Solver for Optimal Power Flow Problem Considering Distributed FACTS Devices

Liu¹,

Edmonds²,

zhang³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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In this paper, we propose an AC optimal power flow (ACOPF) model considering distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices, in which the reactance of D-FACTS equipped lines are introduced as decision variables. This is motivated by increasing interests in using D-FACTS devices to address system operational and cyber-security concerns. First, D-FACTS devices can be incorporated in real-time operations for economic benefits such as managing power congestions and reducing system losses. Second, D-FACTS devices can be utilized by moving target defense (MTD), an emerging concept against cyber-attacks, to prevent attackers from knowing true system configurations. Therefore, system operators can use the proposed ACOPF model to achieve economic benefits and provide the setpoints of D-FACTS devices for MTD at the same time. In addition, we rigorously derive the gradient and Hessian matrices of the objective function and constraints, which are further used to build an interior-point solver of the proposed ACOPF. Numerical results on the IEEE 118-bus transmission system show the validity of the proposed ACOPF model as well as the efficacy of the interior-point solver in minimizing system losses and generation costs. <br>

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“…Recently, the concept of MTD has been applied to defend against FDI attacks [13], [14], [9], [15]. In comparison to these works, we are the first to apply MTD for defense against CCPAs.…”

Section: Prior Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moving-Target Defense for Detecting Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Grids

Lakshminarayana

Belmega

Poor

2019

2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm)

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This work proposes a moving target defense (MTD) strategy to detect coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs) against power grids. A CCPA consists of a physical attack, such as disconnecting a transmission line, followed by a coordinated cyber attack that injects false data into the sensor measurements to mask the effects of the physical attack. Such attacks can lead to undetectable line outages and cause significant damage to the grid. The main idea of the proposed approach is to invalidate the knowledge that the attackers use to mask the effects of the physical attack by actively perturbing the grid's transmission line reactances using distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. We identify the MTD design criteria in this context to thwart CCPAs. The proposed MTD design consists of two parts. First, we identify the subset of links for D-FACTS device deployment that enables the defender to detect CCPAs against any link in the system. Then, in order to minimize the defense cost during the system's operational time, we use a game-theoretic approach to identify the best subset of links (within the D-FACTS deployment set) to perturb which will provide adequate protection. Extensive simulations performed using the MATPOWER simulator on IEEE bus systems verify the effectiveness of our approach in detecting CCPAs and reducing the operator's defense cost.

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Reactance Perturbation for Detecting and Identifying FDI Attacks in Power System State Estimation

Cited by 88 publications

References 27 publications

Smart Grid Cyber-Physical Attack and Defense: A Review

Smart Grid Cyber-Physical Attack and Defense: A Review

An Interior-Point Solver for Optimal Power Flow Problem Considering Distributed FACTS Devices

Moving-Target Defense for Detecting Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Grids

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