‘Real men want to go to Tehran’: Bush, pre-emption and the Iranian nuclear challenge

Abstract

The desire for regime change in Iran has coloured the Bush administration's approach to the challenge presented by Tehran's apparent desire to build a nuclear weapons capability. Yet the threat of military force either to destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure and/or to eff ect regime change has proved counterproductive to the simultaneous eff orts to stop the Iranian programme through diplomacy. Indeed, the entire Bush policy towards Iran of simultaneously wishing to coerce, undermine and replace the regime while also seeking to persuade it to abandon its nuclear programme through diplomacy has proved both strategically inconsistent and consistently counterproductive. In failing to decide whether it prioritizes a change of regime or a change of behaviour it has got neither. This article elucidates the rationale behind the Bush administration's policy approach, demonstrating how in seeking both objectives simultaneously it has achieved neither. It sets out instead a set of policies to regain the initiative in US‐Iranian relations and to prioritize and coordinate American policy goals within a broader Middle East policy.

Representation, recognition and foreign policy in the Iran–US relationship

“…For the US, preventing Iran from being able to weaponise its nuclear programme in future through P5+1 negotiations would prove to itself and other states, Iran included, that the US is rational, benevolent and the leader of the international community, contradicting the misrecognition of the US as a hypocritical bully. For instance, US policy under the Bush administration emphasised that Iran must cede to all demands presented by the UNSC before negotiations could continue; yet, President Bush also maintained that ‘all options are on the table, including military force, to deal with the nuclear threat’ (cited in Dunn, 2007: 20). However, this approach shifted under the Obama administration, with the US signalling in 2009 that it would fully participate in P5+1 negotiations with Iran.…”

“…Overall, these approaches lack an understanding of the powerful dynamics of representation that permeate each state’s engagement with the other, particularly in terms of their views on the progress of Iran’s nuclear programme and what Article IV allows. Realist and neo-realist approaches focus on Middle East balance-of-power dynamics between the US and Iran, reading Iran’s nuclear programme as driven by self-interest and security concerns (see Dunn, 2007; Waltz, 2012). These analyses do not adequately explain how Iran’s decision to progress with its enrichment activities is beneficial to its self-interest, particularly given the security concerns created by crippling sanctions and its increasing isolation.…”

Nested Institutions, Political Opportunity, and the Decline of the Iranian Reform Movement Post 9/11

“…The various rationales associated with why Iran should be "next" were generally considered even more nonsensical (see Amanat, 2002;Daley, 2002). Indeed, there was a variety of public discussions by many who regarded the rhetoric being directed toward Iran as counterproductive to the administration's own policy goals (see Dunn, 2007). Moreover, the Bush administration, in particular as it relates to the intelligence community within the Pentagon, often excluded Middle Eastern experts and created intelligence to justify the policy of preemptive military action and regime change (Miller & Barnes, 2007).…”

“…For example, Iranian nuclear ambitions (a larger issue beginning in 2003) were part of the rationale behind the hard-line stance taken toward Iranians in 2002. Moreover, another clear concern is Iranian support for both Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas (see Dunn, 2007). Space does not permit an accounting of these Iranian policies, but these conditions could also be interpreted as reasons to forge closer ties with reform-minded Iranians.…”

Sanctioning Iran

“…It was because of the US pressure that the matter was referred by IAEA to the UNSC. What surprises the world the most is, current US enthusiasm against Iran despite its failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the obvious impact of this on the credibility of the US administration's doctrine of pre-emption, Washington remains committed to the controversial strategy adopted after 9/11 in both its rhetoric and its official policy (Dunn 2007).…”