Realization and the Formulation of Physicalism

Melnyk, Andrew

doi:10.1007/s11098-005-5986-y

Cited by 42 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Levine 2001;Melnyk 2006;Shoemaker 2007). However, in some paradigm examples of realization, we see the failure of such metaphysical necessitation.…”

Section: Explanation and Necessitationmentioning

confidence: 94%

“…Recall that one way of understanding the "nothing over and above" constraint is the stipulation that a realized property is metaphysically necessitated by its realizer. However, as pointed out by Melnyk (2006) and Kim (2010), the fact that a property P includes the causal powers of Q as a proper subset does not, on its own, entail the fact that having P metaphysically necessitates having Q. In order to account for such entailment, one might have to endorse a dispositionalist conception of properties according to which properties are to be identified by sets of causal powers (Shoemaker 1980).…”

Section: Subset Realizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Realization Relations in Metaphysics

Baysan

2015

Minds & Machines

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“…Levine 2001;Melnyk 2006;Shoemaker 2007). However, in some paradigm examples of realization, we see the failure of such metaphysical necessitation.…”

Section: Explanation and Necessitationmentioning

confidence: 94%

Section: Subset Realizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Realization Relations in Metaphysics

Baysan

2015

Minds & Machines

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“…Sometimes, we see the use of the locution of a "power of a property": the powers that are associated with a property P are those that are powers of P. But this is a misleading locution, as properties don't have causal powers -their bearers do.7 There must be some relationship between P and the bearers of P that can explain why some causal powers of P's bearers are 3 E.g., Shoemaker (1981), LePore and Loewer (1989), Levine (2001), Melnyk (2006). 4 See Poland (1994), Melnyk (2003), Shoemaker (2007), Wilson (2011) for examples.…”

Section: ***mentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal Powers and the Necessity of Realization

Baysan

2017

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

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Non-reductive physicalists hold that mental properties are realized by physical properties. The realization relation is typically taken to be a metaphysical necessitation relation. Here, I explore how the metaphysical necessitation feature of realization can be explained by what is known as "the subset view" of realization. The subset view holds that the causal powers that are associated with a realized property are a proper subset of the causal powers that are associated with the realizer property. I argue that the said explanation of the metaphysical necessitation feature requires a careful treatment of the relationship between properties and causal powers. ***Non-reductive physicalism is typically understood as the view that mental properties are realized by physical properties. What counts as a case of realization is widely disputed.1 According to a commonly-held view, realization is a relation between two properties, the realizer property P and the realized property Q, whereby something's having P somehow brings about its having Q. Surely, "brings about the instantiation of" is a predicate that can pick out many relations. What is distinctive about realization, according to the standard picture, is that such bringing-about is supposed to hold non-contingently and synchronically: If P realizes Q, then, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, if x is a bearer of P at a time t, then x is also a bearer of Q at t.On this understanding, if physicalism is true, insofar as x is a bearer of a physical realizer of a mental property M, there isn't anything that needs to be added to the intrinsic properties of x to make it the case that x has M. Thanks to taking realization as a metaphysical necessitation relation, we can easily distinguish a realization-based version of non-reductive physicalism from some non-physicalist views which also hold that mental property instances are brought about by physical property instances where such bringing-about holds only contingently.2 It 1 See Baysan (2015) for discussion of different accounts of realization.2 Noordhof (2003) persuasively argues for a related claim. As an example of such non-physicalist views, consider the view that phenomenal mental properties supervene nomologically, but not metaphysically, on physical properties (Chalmers 1996).

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“…There is a fair bit of disagreement as to how to understand the thesis of realization and how it can be applied to physicalism (Gillett 2002(Gillett , 2003Melnyk 2003Melnyk , 2006Poland 1994;Polger 2007;Polger and Shapiro 2008;Shoemaker 2007). For present purposes, I shall focus on two influential accounts of realization that have been employed in the service of physicalism: Andrew Melnyk's realization physicalism (Melnyk 2003(Melnyk , 2006 and Sidney Shoemaker's causal subset account of realization (Shoemaker 2001(Shoemaker , 2007(Shoemaker , 2011see also;Watkins 2002;Wilson 1999Wilson , 2011. My aim is to examine whether such articulations of realization can provide an account of the primacy of the physical.…”

Section: Realizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In previous work, Andrew Melnyk has advanced and defended a realization formulation of physicalism (Melnyk 2003(Melnyk , 2006. To a first approximation, Melnyk takes physicalism to be the view according to which every entity-token is either narrowly physical (i.e., it is a type of an entity that is mentioned in the laws and theories of more or less current physics) or physically realized by some narrowly physical entity-token.…”

Section: The Special Issuementioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction: The Character of Physicalism

Elpidorou

2017

Topoi

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naturalism, and dualism are reconsidered. The special issue is neither the first nor the last word on the topic of the character physicalism. Nonetheless, it offers both an updated appraisal of our current understanding of physicalism and concrete proposals for how to move forward. Physicalism: Ontology and MetaphysicsAt the heart of physicalism lies an ontological (or if you prefer, ontic) thesis.1 To espouse physicalism is to make certain commitments about what types of things (objects, properties, events, states of affairs) exist in our world (Quine 1948; cf. Hellman and Thompson 1977, p. 310).2 IfNot many issues in philosophy can be said to match, let alone rival, physicalism's importance, persistent influence, and divisiveness. To a first approximation, physicalism holds that everything that exists in our world is physical. An acceptance of physicalism commits thus one to a monistic worldview. Despite how variegated existing entities or properties might appear to be, everything that exists in our world is, according to physicalism, the same: namely, physical. Indeed, it is widely thought that physicalism demands not only that the non-physical (the chemical, the biological, the economic, the social, the mental, etc.) metaphysically depends on the physical but also that the non-physical is nothing over and above the physical. But what type of metaphysical dependence vindicates physicalism?The aim of this editorial introduction is twofold. First, Sects. 1-8 offer a critical introduction to the metaphysical character of physicalism. In those sections, I present and evaluate different ways in which proponents of physicalism have made explicit the metaphysical dependence that is said to hold between the non-physical and the physical. Some of these accounts are found to be problematic; others are shown to be somewhat more promising. In the end, some important lessons are drawn and different options for physicalists are presented. Second, in Sect. 9, the six papers that comprise the special issue are introduced and summarized. Each contribution to the special is, in different ways, concerned with explicating the character of physicalism. New ways of formulating physicalism are assessed; old ways are defended; and the distinctions between physicalism, Both terms are acceptable and the choice between them is ultimately idiosyncratic. "Physicalism" has the benefit of rendering the metaphysical view under discussion both more general (the extension of "physical," I presume, is larger than that of "material") and closer to present-day physics. "Materialism" has the benefit of showing how the metaphysical view under discussion has a historical lineage and as such relates to the views of Hobbes, Lucretius, and Democritus. 2 It is often stated that physicalism is both a contingent thesis and one that has strong modal commitments (Lewis 1983;Jackson 1998; Stoljar 2015). Its contingency is manifested in the claim that physicalism is a thesis about our world and even if it is true, it did not have to be so. Furthermore, the ...

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Realization and the Formulation of Physicalism

Cited by 42 publications

References 6 publications

Realization Relations in Metaphysics

Realization Relations in Metaphysics

Causal Powers and the Necessity of Realization

Introduction: The Character of Physicalism

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