2010
DOI: 10.1080/09512741003624468
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Reappraising the debate and practice of US strategic ambiguity/clarity in cross-strait relations

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2013
2013
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
6

Relationship

0
6

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 8 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Most dichotomies overlook the use of mixed strategies. Some scholars have noted that US policy-makers have positioned themselves in different positions along a continuum between strategic clarity and ambiguity in the history of US foreign policy (Hsu, 2010; Wu, 2021). Moreover, the existing recommendations appear to be an extension of the strategic ambiguity (Chang-Liao and Fang, 2021) because most of them do not match the rigid definition of strategic clarity.…”
Section: Theoretical Framework Of Us Taiwan Policymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Most dichotomies overlook the use of mixed strategies. Some scholars have noted that US policy-makers have positioned themselves in different positions along a continuum between strategic clarity and ambiguity in the history of US foreign policy (Hsu, 2010; Wu, 2021). Moreover, the existing recommendations appear to be an extension of the strategic ambiguity (Chang-Liao and Fang, 2021) because most of them do not match the rigid definition of strategic clarity.…”
Section: Theoretical Framework Of Us Taiwan Policymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, despite calls for greater clarity, on balance, the policy has served U.S. interests well and in general contributed to cross-Strait stability. In fact, succeeding administrations have for all practical purposes carried out policies that span over the spectrum of clarity at one end and ambiguity at the other (Hsu 2010;Kastner 2006). Despite recent debates among American Taiwan specialists on whether Washington should discontinue arms sales to Taiwan in exchange for a grand bargain with Beijing, or accept the "Finlandization" of Taiwan by China (C. Glaser 2015; Gilley 2010), the mainstream U.S. view is that Taiwan remains a critical linchpin in its "Pivot to Asia" strategy and an important strategic asset in the first island chain.…”
Section: China's Rise and Us Taiwan Policymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It would not be surprising that with such rhetoric, Asian states are expecting US to display its military might in Asia yet again, as how Bill Clinton reacted during the third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-96 displaying one of the largest US military displays with the presence of numerous aircraft battle groups (Hsu, 2010). Obama's rhetoric has already caused damage, thus there is no single institution, nor global superpower that would be able to relieve China of its perception that US is forcefully containing it, and that US would interfere on regional conflicts located hundred of miles of the US mainland.…”
Section: Asia-pacific and The Rhetoric Of Coercivenessmentioning
confidence: 99%