Reasoning about space: The hole story

Varzi, Achille C.

doi:10.12775/llp.1996.001

Cited by 20 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…In fact, if the mereotopological structure of the domain of reference is as fine-grained as demanded by the physical sciences, then physical objects of the garden variety can only be included in an inventory of the world as a result of such a loosening of (G): no bona fide boundary would individuate them. 27 On the ontology and mereotopology of holes see Casati and Varzi [1994] and Varzi [1996b]. 28 For the notion of a fiat boundary I refer to Smith [1995] and Smith and Varzi [1999].…”

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confidence: 99%

Mereological Commitments

Varzi¹

2005

Dialectica

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Abstract. We tend to talk about (refer to, quantify over) parts in the same way in which we talk about whole objects. Yet a part is not something to be included in an inventory of the world over and above the whole to which it belongs, and a whole is not something to be included in an inventory over and above its own parts. This paper is an attempt to clarify a way of dealing with this tension which may be labeled the Minimalist View: an element in the field of a part-whole relation is to be included in an inventory of the world if, and only if, it does not overlap any other element that is itself included in the inventory. As it turns out, a clarification of this view involves both a defense of mereological extensionality and an account of the topological distinction between detached and undetached parts (and the parallel opposition between scattered and connected wholes).

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confidence: 99%

Mereological Commitments

Varzi¹

2005

Dialectica

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“…,a n ) in a specific space-time volume (ω), a portion of the space-time continuum. The types of relationship (R) between the entities can be of diverse nature, such as mereotopological or temporal (for a better account of these, see the work of Smith [22,23], Varzi [24] and Freksa [25]). Situations, however, while carrying their own identity, are not unique temporal states that need to be determined every time, but can be approximated as an instance of a situation type (where the situation type is just the closest logical counterpart of the CT of a situation, used here to determine its membership function), which is a prototypical situation we have experience of, and helps us determine a specific perspective or a behavioural pattern to follow.…”

Section: Semantic Marksmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Ontological Approach to the Description of Visual and Iconographical Representations

Carboni

Luca²

2019

Heritage

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The perception of our heritage is based on sign-functions, which relate visual representations to cognitive types, allowing us to make perceptual judgements over physical objects. The recording of these types of assertions is paramount for the comprehension and analysis of our heritage. The article investigates a theoretical framework for the organization of information related to visual works on the basis of the identity and symbolic value of their single constituent elements. The framework developed is then used as a driver for the grounding of a new ontology called VIR (Visual Representation), constructed as an extension of CIDOC-CRM (CIDOC Conceptual Reference Model). VIR sustains the recording of statements about the different structural units and relationships of a visual representation, differentiating between object and interpretative act. The result, tested with data describing Byzantine and Renaissance artworks, presents solutions for describing symbols and meanings of iconographical objects, providing new clustering methods in relation to their constitutive elements, subjects or interpretations.

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“…At this point it is worth mentioning some previous work on dealing (separately) with holes and strings from a formal standpoint. Reasoning about holes and holed objects have been discussed in detail in [23] and [24], whereby a formal ontology for these entities, based on their topological aspects, is developed. In the present work we assume holes as sharing the same level of existence as rigid objects, i.e., they are reified individuals that can be involved in actions.…”

Section: The Fisherman's Folly Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

Formalising the Fisherman's Folly puzzle

Cabalar

Santos

2011

Artificial Intelligence

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This paper investigates the challenging problem of encoding the common sense knowledge involved in the manipulation of spatial objects from a reasoning about actions and change perspective. In particular, we propose a formal solution to a puzzle composed of non-trivial objects (such as holes and strings) assuming a version of the Situation Calculus written over first-order Equilibrium Logic, whose models generalise the stable model semantics.

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Reasoning about space: The hole story

Cited by 20 publications

References 24 publications

Mereological Commitments

Mereological Commitments

An Ontological Approach to the Description of Visual and Iconographical Representations

Formalising the Fisherman's Folly puzzle

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