Reasoning and Moral Decision-Making: A Critique of the Social Intuitionist Model

Kasachkoff, Tziporah; Saltzstein, Herbert D.

doi:10.3233/dev-2008-2307

Cited by 3 publications

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“…For example, according to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model, we first form our moral judgments and decisions with basis on intuitions and emotions and then give reasons for them, our reasons serving as ex-post facto rationalizations to convince ourselves/others that our moral judgments and decisions are a reason-based process. As previously argued, to ignore or even overlook the role of moral reasoning in any moral theory amounts to not having any moral theory at all (see Kasachkoff & Saltzstein, 2006). It suffices to say that moral reasons are part and parcel of the definition of the moral action itself.…”

Section: Kohlberg and Damon And Colbymentioning

confidence: 99%

Why be moral? In defense of a Kohlbergian approach

Lourenço

2014

Psychologica

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A navegação consulta e descarregamento dos títulos inseridos nas Bibliotecas Digitais UC Digitalis, UC Pombalina e UC Impactum, pressupõem a aceitação plena e sem reservas dos Termos e Condições de Uso destas Bibliotecas Digitais, disponíveis em https://digitalis.uc.pt/pt-pt/termos. Conforme exposto nos referidos Termos e Condições de Uso, o descarregamento de títulos de acesso restrito requer uma licença válida de autorização devendo o utilizador aceder ao(s) documento(s) a partir de um endereço de IP da instituição detentora da supramencionada licença. Ao utilizador é apenas permitido o descarregamento para uso pessoal, pelo que o emprego do(s) título(s) descarregado(s) para outro fim, designadamente comercial, carece de autorização do respetivo autor ou editor da obra. Na medida em que todas as obras da UC Digitalis se encontram protegidas pelo Código do Direito de Autor e Direitos Conexos e demais legislação aplicável, toda a cópia, parcial ou total, deste documento, nos casos em que é legalmente admitida, deverá conter ou fazer-se acompanhar por este aviso. Why be moral? In defense of a Kohlbergian approach Autor(es):Abstract This article revolves around the "Why be moral?" question, a fundamental ethical question raised by Kohlberg and Ryncarz (1990) in the field of moral development. The study is in three parts. In the first part, Introduction, I refer to this fundamental ethical question and the questions related to it. In the second part, I compare Kohlberg's response to that question and the questions related to it with those given, implicitly or explicitly, by other relevant figures of developmental psychology. Contrary to other developmental psychologists, I argue that, for several reasons, Kohlberg's response to the why be moral question is more complete and deeper than that presented by the relevant developmental figures analyzed in this article. Despite this, I recognize that, as far as the other questions associated with the why be moral question are concerned, all those figures made important contributions to a better understanding of one's moral functioning, and that some of them explored moral issues, which, to some extent, were overlooked by Kohlberg. In the third part, Final Words, I summarize the main ideas of the paper and enumerate several reasons why Kohlberg's answer to the why be moral question is the most complete and deepest one among those presented so far in the field of moral development. ResumoEste artigo anda em torno da questão "Porquê ser moral?", uma questão ética fundamental levantada por Kohlberg e Ryncarz (1990) no campo do desenvolvimento moral. O artigo consta de três partes. Na primeira parte, Introdução, refiro-me a essa questão ética fundamental e às questões relacionadas com tal questão. Na segunda, comparo a resposta de Kohlberg a todas estas questões com as respostas a tais questões que foram dadas, implícita ou explicitamente, por outras figuras relevantes da psicologia do desenvolvimento. Ao invés de outros psicólogos do desenvolvimento, argumento que, por razões ...

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Section: Kohlberg and Damon And Colbymentioning

confidence: 99%

Why be moral? In defense of a Kohlbergian approach

Lourenço

2014

Psychologica

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“…Conscious reasoning involving moral values and moral principles is thereby virtually excluded from having any direct influence on moral judgment ( Haidt, 2001 ). Rationalists give a more prominent place to the process of conscious reasoning in forming moral judgment, featuring moral values and moral principles ( Kohlberg, 1984 ; Rest, 1986 ; Kasachkoff and Saltzstein, 2008 ; Kennett and Fine, 2009 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Are General Moral Values Poor Predictors of Concrete Moral Behavior in Everyday Life? A Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Study

2022

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Within moral psychology, theories focusing on the conceptualization and empirical measurement of people’s morality in terms of general moral values –such as Moral Foundation Theory- (implicitly) assume general moral values to be relevant concepts for the explanation and prediction of behavior in everyday life. However, a solid theoretical and empirical foundation for this idea remains work in progress. In this study we explore this relationship between general moral values and daily life behavior through a conceptual analysis and an empirical study. Our conceptual analysis of the moral value-moral behavior relationship suggests that the effect of a generally endorsed moral value on moral behavior is highly context dependent. It requires the manifestation of several phases of moral decision-making, each influenced by many contextual factors. We expect that this renders the empirical relationship between generic moral values and people’s concrete moral behavior indeterminate. Subsequently, we empirically investigate this relationship in three different studies. We relate two different measures of general moral values -the Moral Foundation Questionnaire and the Morality As Cooperation Questionnaire- to a broad set of self-reported morally relevant daily life behaviors (including adherence to COVID-19 measures and participation in voluntary work). Our empirical results are in line with the expectations derived from our conceptual analysis: the considered general moral values are poor predictors of the selected daily life behaviors. Furthermore, moral values that were tailored to the specific context of the behavior showed to be somewhat stronger predictors. Together with the insights derived from our conceptual analysis, this indicates the relevance of the contextual nature of moral decision-making as a possible explanation for the poor predictive value of general moral values. Our findings suggest that the investigation of morality’s influence on behavior by expressing and measuring it in terms of general moral values may need revision.

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“…But seeKasachkoff and Saltzstein (2008) for a critique of the social intuitionist model. 2 But seeMay (2014) for a critique of the philosophical significance of the purported relation between disgust and moral judgment.…”

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confidence: 99%

Moralization and Mismoralization in Public Health

Kraaijeveld

Jamrozik

2022

Med Health Care and Philos

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Moralization is a social-psychological process through which morally neutral issues take on moral significance. Often linked to health and disease, moralization may sometimes lead to good outcomes; yet moralization is often detrimental to individuals and to society as a whole. It is therefore important to be able to identify when moralization is inappropriate. In this paper, we offer a systematic normative approach to the evaluation of moralization. We introduce and develop the concept of ‘mismoralization’, which is when moralization is metaethically unjustified. In order to identify mismoralization, we argue that one must engage in metaethical analysis of moralization processes while paying close attention to the relevant facts. We briefly discuss one historical example (tuberculosis) and two contemporary cases related to COVID-19 (infection and vaccination status) that we contend to have been mismoralized in public health. We propose a remedy of de-moralization that begins by identifying mismoralization and that proceeds by neutralizing inapt moral content. De-moralization calls for epistemic and moral humility. It should lead us to pull away from our tendency to moralize—as individuals and as social groups—whenever and wherever moralization is unjustified.

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Reasoning and Moral Decision-Making: A Critique of the Social Intuitionist Model

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Why be moral? In defense of a Kohlbergian approach

Why be moral? In defense of a Kohlbergian approach

Why Are General Moral Values Poor Predictors of Concrete Moral Behavior in Everyday Life? A Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Study

Moralization and Mismoralization in Public Health

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