7th-grade children were assessed on several dimensions of moral development by means of paper-and-pencil tests and ratings by parents, teachers, and peers. Extreme groups were formed along each of these dimensions, and they were compared on measures of parental discipline based on reports by the children themselves and by each of the parents. Discipline techniques were coded into 3 categories: power assertion, in which the parent capitalizes on his power and authority over the child; love withdrawal, i.e., direct but nonphysical expressions of anger, disapproval, etc.; and induction, consisting of the parent's focusing on the consequences of the child's action for others. Data from middle-and lower-class boys and girls were analyzed separately. IQ was controlled for each analysis. With considerable-but not complete-• consistency, advanced development along the various moral dimensions was associated with infrequent use of power assertion and frequent use of induction among the middle-class sample. Love withdrawal, on the other hand, related infrequently to moral development.

Jon Haidt's (2001) proposal for a moral intutionist theory of morality is criticized on psychological and philosophical grounds, including (a) the apparent reduction of social influence to one kind, overt compliance, and the virtual ignoring of the role of persuasion in moral and other decision making; (b) the failure to distinguish development of a psychological entity from its deployment or functioning; and (c) the failure to consider, in distinguishing cause and reason as explanatory concepts, the motivating power of reasons. Arguments for an evolutionary approach to morality are also faulted on the grounds that they assume that adaptation is served by nonmoral rather than moral (fairness- and benevolence-based) criteria. Finally, the authors suggest that an intuitionist approach such as that of Haidt may obscure important aspects of moral decision making.

Pairs of hypothetical medical and non-medical problems were given to 44 pediatric residents at three levels of hospital training. Each problem was designed to detect a specific heuristic-based bias in making diagnoses. Discounting, disregarding base rate, and over-confidence in contextually embedded redundant information were more evident on medical than on non-medical problems. In particular, a greater number of third-year residents disregarded base-rate information than did first- and second-year residents on medical but not on non-medical problems. On medical problems, a greater number of first-year residents expressed greater confidence in redundant information that was contextually embedded than in information that was presented in a listed format. Over one-third of the residents confused prospective and retrospective probabilities; three-fourths showed evidence of augmentation; virtually all residents expressed greater confidence in a diagnosis based on redundant rather than on non-redundant listed information. These latter effects were consistent across training level and occurred on both medical and non-medical problems. The results are discussed in terms of prototype theory and the nature of medical training.

\NY previous studies of conformity behavior-among them the wellknown experiments of Sherif and Asch (1, 2, 11)-have employed situations where the forces to conform were essentially cognitive in origin. A person in a situation of judgment or choice is confronted with contradictory information from two different sources. He has to weigh the evidence provided by his own perception of the stimulus against his knowledge of the actions or judgments of other persons. Festinger (5) has pointed out that a person will have a need for social reality, i.e., a need to depend upon information provided directly or indirectly by others, to the degree that his information from so-called physical sources is inadequate.Forces to conform which are created by a person's need for social reality have their source in his desire to make an appropriate rather than an inappropriate response, or to perceive the world accurately rather than inaccurately. This process of coming to cognitive terms with his environment can be distinguished from other processes of conformity that are influenced by the person's membership or nonrnembership in a group, the strength of his attraction to membership, or the relevance of the situation to the goals of the group.In experiments by Festinger, Thibaut, Schachter, and others (5, 6, 10), forces to conform were created which derived from pressures towards uniformity in a problemsolving group. These forces, generated by a process called group locomotion, are induced upon all persons who belong to the group and, especially, upon any deviant who may be blocking the group's progress toward its goal. The more attractive a group is for a member, the stronger are the forces from this source acting upon him to conform (3, 5).1 This study was conducted under Contract Nonr-1224(11) with the Office of Naval Research. A mimeographed report containing the detailed instruments and procedures is available elsewhere (9). This article is based in part on a report to the annual meetings of the American Psychological Association, September 1956.