Haidt's Moral Intuitionist Theory: A Psychological and Philosophical Critique

Abstract

Jon Haidt's (2001) proposal for a moral intutionist theory of morality is criticized on psychological and philosophical grounds, including (a) the apparent reduction of social influence to one kind, overt compliance, and the virtual ignoring of the role of persuasion in moral and other decision making; (b) the failure to distinguish development of a psychological entity from its deployment or functioning; and (c) the failure to consider, in distinguishing cause and reason as explanatory concepts, the motivating power of reasons. Arguments for an evolutionary approach to morality are also faulted on the grounds that they assume that adaptation is served by nonmoral rather than moral (fairness- and benevolence-based) criteria. Finally, the authors suggest that an intuitionist approach such as that of Haidt may obscure important aspects of moral decision making.

Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?

“…Reflection on the good and defensible life engages meta-cognitive processes with input from a wide range of sources including ones desires, emotions, moods, personal history, and principles. Second, it is consistent with this view that the particular value judgments we make in line with our reflective views could become fast and habitual over time, as noted by Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004). Learning to drive is initially cognitively demanding and effortful but as we all know once the skills are learned driving becomes automatic.…”

Unpacking Intuition: A Process and Outcome Framework

“…moral intuitions) are a result of evolution "equipping [Homo sapiens], and other primates, for an intensely social life" (Haidt, 2004, p.286). It should be noted however that the SIM has not been without its critics, for example Saltzstein and Kasachkoff (2004).…”

The Evolution of a Sense of Justice

“…Many theorists have focused on the signifi cance of moral argumentation in the production of standards of justice (e.g., Damon & Hart, 1992;Habermas, 1993;Piaget, 1932). When people engage in moral argumentation, they may attempt to push one another's emotional buttons (Haidt, 2001), or they may appeal to one another's rational faculties (Saltzstein & Kasachkoff, 2004 …”