Reasoning in humans. II. The solution of a problem and its appearance in consciousness.

Maier, Norman R. F.

doi:10.1037/h0071361

Cited by 497 publications

(328 citation statements)

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“…Subsequent insight only occurred if the problem solver realized that the matchbox could be used in a different way (i.e., as a ledge). Maier (1931) explained the findings of his two-cord problem in a similar way. Two cords hanging from a ceiling had to be tied together but could not actually be held in the hands at the same time.…”

Section: Studies Of Mental Set and Insight Set And Insight In Problemmentioning

confidence: 79%

Investigating the Effect of Mental Set on Insight Problem Solving

Öllinger

Jones

Knoblich

2008

Experimental Psychology

114

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Mental set is the tendency to solve certain problems in a fixed way based on previous solutions to similar problems. The moment of insight occurs when a problem cannot be solved using solution methods suggested by prior experience and the problem solver suddenly realizes that the solution requires different solution methods. Mental set and insight have often been linked together and yet no attempt thus far has systematically examined the interplay between the two. Three experiments are presented that examine the extent to which sets of non-insight and insight problems affect the subsequent solutions of insight test problems. The results indicate a subtle interplay between mental set and insight: when the set involves non-insight problems, no mental set effects are shown for the insight test problems, yet when the set involves insight problems, both facilitation and inhibition can be seen depending on the type of insight problem presented in the set. A two process model is detailed to explain these findings that combines the representational change mechanism with that of proceduralisation.Set and Insight in Problem Solving 3

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Section: Studies Of Mental Set and Insight Set And Insight In Problemmentioning

confidence: 79%

Investigating the Effect of Mental Set on Insight Problem Solving

Öllinger

Jones

Knoblich

2008

Experimental Psychology

114

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“…Many researchers have argued that developing insight into solving verbal (e.g., riddles) or nonverbal (e.g., mathematics) problems is a unique subjective experience supported by distinct cognitive and neural processes (Duncker, 1945;Köhler, 1925;Luo & Niki, 2003;Maier, 1931;Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993). Moreover, some researchers have maintained that solutions to problems involving insight are remembered better than those derived without insight (Luo & Niki, 2003).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of "effort after meaning" on recall: Differences in within- and between-subjects designs

Zaromb

Roediger

2009

Memory & Cognition

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What is the relationship between comprehension and memory? Ebbinghaus (1885Ebbinghaus ( /1964 began the scientific study of memory by attempting to avoid this question. By studying memory for three-letter trigrams under controlled experimental conditions, he assumed that he would not have to be concerned about the variability in how subjects understood or related to the stimuli. Nonetheless, Ebbinghaus noted that the lists of syllables he memorized exhibit very important and almost incomprehensible variations as to the ease or difficulty with which they are learned. It even appears from this point of view as if the differences between sense and nonsense material were not nearly as great as one would be inclined a priori to imagine. (p. 23) Others who followed in Ebbinghaus's footsteps measured differences in the meaningfulness of nonsense syllables (e.g., Archer, 1960;Glaze, 1928;Hull, 1933) in order to afford researchers better experimental control over these presumed variations in learning (see also Jenkins, 1985). Even the plainest materials seem to require an effort to find meaningfulness in order to comprehend and remember them (e.g., Prytulak, 1971).In contrast to Ebbinghaus's (1885/1964) approach, Bartlett (1932) presumed a direct relationship between processes involved in comprehension and acts of remembering. Specifically, Bartlett proposed that individuals engaged in a process of "effort after meaning," of which he wrote, it is fitting to speak of every human cognitive reaction-perceiving, imaging, remembering, thinking, and reasoning-as an effort after meaning. Certain of the tendencies which the subject brings with him into the situation with which he is called upon to deal are utilized so as to make his reaction the "easiest," or the least disagreeable, or the quickest and least obstructed that is at the time possible. When we try to discover how this is done we find that always it is by an effort to connect what is given with something else. (p. 44) In experiencing the world, humans presumably bring their past knowledge to bear on understanding current happenings. When it comes to remembering past occurrences, Bartlett argued that people attempt to make their recollections conform to cultural expectations, prior background knowledge, or the current context.To directly examine effort after meaning as it relates to memory, Auble and Franks (1978) developed an ingenious experimental paradigm in which subjects heard and later attempted to recall ambiguous sentences, such as "The clothes were ruined because the sign vanished," that were presented with or without disambiguating cues (i.e., wet paint). Where cues were provided, their conditions of presentation varied. In a control condition, the cue was meaningfully embedded within the sentence (i.e., "The clothes were ruined because the wet paint sign vanished"). In other conditions, the sentence preceded the cue. In four experiments, we examined free recall of ambiguous sentences with or without corresponding cues to facilitate comprehension, using A...

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“…This link was made explicit by German and Defeyter (2000), who studied the impact of artifact concepts on children's performance on a class of objectuse problems made popular by the Gestalt school of psychology (e.g. Duncker, 1945;Maier, 1931). In these tasks, the subject needs to solve a problem using a particular object of known function (variously, a box, a paperclip, a screwdriver, etc.).…”

Section: Problem Solving and The Representation Of Artifact Functionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Acquiring an understanding of design: evidence from children's insight problem solving

2003

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The human ability to make tools and use them to solve problems may not be zoologically unique, but it is certainly extraordinary. Yet little is known about the conceptual machinery that makes humans so competent at making and using tools. Do adults and children have concepts specialized for understanding human-made artifacts? If so, are these concepts deployed in attempts to solve novel problems? Here we present new data, derived from problem-solving experiments, which support the following. (i) The structure of the child's concept of artifact function changes profoundly between ages 5 and 7. At age 5, the child's conceptual machinery defines the function of an artifact as any goal a user might have; by age 7, its function is defined by the artifact's typical or intended use.(ii) This conceptual shift has a striking effect on problem-solving performance, i.e. the child's concept of artifact function appears to be deployed in problem solving. (iii) This effect on problem solving is not caused by differences in the amount of knowledge that children have about the typical use of a particular tool; it is mediated by the structure of the child's artifact concept (which organizes and deploys the child's knowledge). In two studies, children between 5 and 7 years of age were matched for their knowledge of what a particular artifact "is for", and then given a problem that can only be solved if that tool is used for an atypical purpose. All children performed well in a baseline condition. But when they were primed by a demonstration of the artifact's typical function, 5-yearold children solved the problem much faster than 6 -7-year-old children. Because all children knew what the tools were for, differences in knowledge alone cannot explain the results. We argue that the older children were slower to solve the problem when the typical function was primed because (i) their artifact concept plays a role in problem solving, and (ii) intended purpose is central to their concept of artifact function, but not to that of the younger children. q

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Reasoning in humans. II. The solution of a problem and its appearance in consciousness.

Cited by 497 publications

References 1 publication

Investigating the Effect of Mental Set on Insight Problem Solving

Investigating the Effect of Mental Set on Insight Problem Solving

The effects of "effort after meaning" on recall: Differences in within- and between-subjects designs

Acquiring an understanding of design: evidence from children's insight problem solving

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