Reasons to Desire and Desiring at Will

Abstract

There is an unresolved conflict concerning the normative nature of desire. Some authors take rational desire to differ from rational belief in being a normatively unconstrained attitude. Others insist that rational desire seems plausibly subject to several consistency norms. This article argues that the correct analysis of this conflict of conative normativity leads us to acknowledge intrinsic and extrinsic reasons to desire. If sound, this point helps us to unveil a fundamental aspect of desire, namely, that we cannot desire at will. Unlike belief, however, desire can unproblematically accommodate a notion of instrumental attitude.

Norms for pure desire

“…If correct, this shows that conjunction equivalence is not a norm to be preserved for any attitude whatsoever. I have in fact argued elsewhere that norms that hold for desire are distinctive and respond to a specific domain of rationality (see Verdejo, 2017b) and thus am ready to accept that norms governing belief may not apply or not apply in the same way to desire.…”