2012
DOI: 10.1057/cep.2012.19
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Reassessing Duvergerian semi-presidentialism: An electoral perspective

Abstract: The oldest definition of semi-presidentialism requires a president possessing considerable constitutional power. Subsequent research has listed presidential competences, but has not empirically set their respective weighting. In order to assess the relevant competences that determine presidential power, this article presents an indicator of relative turnout in 28 parliamentary democracies with a popularly elected president. The core hypothesis is that if presidents have considerable power, the turnout is highe… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
3
0
1

Year Published

2014
2014
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
6

Relationship

0
6

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 6 publications
(4 citation statements)
references
References 33 publications
0
3
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…A similar situation is common for Georgia since 2013, since an unsuccessful vote of investiture in a cabinet leads to the dissolution of parliament and authorisation of the previous cabinet. Instead, in another group of countries (Armenia in 1995-2018, Belarus since 1996, Bulgaria since 1991, Croatia since 2000, Georgia in 2004-2013, Russia since 1993, unsuccessful votes of investiture in cabinets still lead or previously led to formation of permanent or interim cabinets, dissolution of the legislatures and their early elections. In contrast, the choice between dissolution and early elections of parliaments or interim cabinets' formation was previously common in Poland (1992Poland ( -1997 and Turkey (2007Turkey ( -2018.…”
Section: Options and Parameters Of Cabinet Formation Under Semi--pres...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A similar situation is common for Georgia since 2013, since an unsuccessful vote of investiture in a cabinet leads to the dissolution of parliament and authorisation of the previous cabinet. Instead, in another group of countries (Armenia in 1995-2018, Belarus since 1996, Bulgaria since 1991, Croatia since 2000, Georgia in 2004-2013, Russia since 1993, unsuccessful votes of investiture in cabinets still lead or previously led to formation of permanent or interim cabinets, dissolution of the legislatures and their early elections. In contrast, the choice between dissolution and early elections of parliaments or interim cabinets' formation was previously common in Poland (1992Poland ( -1997 and Turkey (2007Turkey ( -2018.…”
Section: Options and Parameters Of Cabinet Formation Under Semi--pres...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…2007-2014 arasındaki "cumhurbaşkanı Gülbaşbakan Erdoğan" döneminde başbakanlıkta olan güç ibresi, 2014-2017 arasındaki "cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğanbaşbakan Davutoğlu" (sonradan Binali Yıldırım) dönemlerinde cumhurbaşkanlığına kaymıştır. Yarıbaşkanlık ile yönetilen ülkelerde başkanın gücünü ölçen nicel çalışmalar (Cheibub, 2007(Cheibub, , 2008Shugart & Carey, 1992;Frye, 1997;Hellman, 1996Hellman, , 1997Magni-Berton, 2013;Metcalf, 2000;Roper, 2002;Fortin, 2012;Siaroff, 2003) başkanın gücünün her ülkede farklı olduğunu göstermektedir. O halde yarı-başkanlık sistemi için giriş bölümünde belirtilen bazı temel özellikler ile iktifa etmemiz gerekmektedir.…”
Section: -2017: Parlamenter Sistemden Yarı-başkanlığaunclassified
“…Roper (2002) made use of this idea and advanced the labels into mutually exclusive categories. It is an important step from the discussion of semi-presidentialism as a mixed-type, to these now widely accepted subtypes of the colorful semi-presidentialism category (see, for a different perspective, Magni-Berton, 2012).…”
Section: Functional Equivalences and Constitutional Choicesmentioning
confidence: 99%