Reassortants of pandemic influenza A virus H1N1/2009 and endemic porcine HxN2 viruses emerge in swine populations in Germany

Starick, Elke; Lange, Elke; Grund, Christian; Beilage, Elisabeth große; Döhring, S.; Maas, Alexander; Noe, T.; Beer, Martin; Harder, Timm C.

doi:10.1099/vir.0.042648-0

Cited by 38 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Reassortants between A(H1N1)pdm09 and swine H3N2 viruses have also been described from other parts of the world, e.g. Canada (Tremblay et al, 2011), China (Fan et al, 2012) and Europe (Starick et al, 2012).…”

Section: Origin and Characterisation Of H3n2v Virusmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Following the establishment of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in domestic pigs worldwide (originating from an as yet unidentified source), a significant number of A(H1N1)pdm09 and enzootic swine influenza reassortants (involving both H1 and H3 subtypes) has been described over the last three years in the USA (Ducatez et al, 2011;Kitikoon et al, 2012;Nelson et al, 2012b), Canada (Tremblay et al, 2011), Europe (Starick et al, 2012) and Asia (Fan et al, 2012;Liu et al, 2012a). H3N2pM is one example of a reassortant that has become established in US swine herds.…”

Section: Emergence Of a New Pandemic Strain From H3n2vmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Co-circulation of enzootic SIVs with A(H1N1)pdm09 has resulted in various reassortants that have mainly exchanged HA and/or NA genes (Howard et al, 2011;Moreno et al, 2011;Bányai et al, 2012;Starick et al, 2012Starick et al, , 2011.…”

Section: Epidemiology Of H3n2 Influenza Viruses In Pigs In the Eumentioning

confidence: 99%

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Scientific opinion on the possible risks posed by the influenza A (H3N2v) virus for animal health and its potential spread and implications for animal and human health

Authié¹,

Berg²,

Bøtner³

et al. 2013

EFS2

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Swine are an important host in influenza virus ecology since they are susceptible to infections with both avian and human influenza A viruses. In 2011 and 2012, clusters of human infection with a swine‐origin influenza A(H3N2) variant virus (H3N2v) containing the matrix (M) gene from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus were reported in the United States (US). The likelihood of introduction of H3N2v virus into the EU, and subsequent exposure and infection of EU pig herds was assessed. The overall likelihood of a pig holding in the EU being infected by exposure to H3N2v virus through either imported infectious pigs or humans coming from the US was estimated to be low. Efficient separation of imported pigs for 30 days would reduce the likelihood of exposure to a negligible level. The likelihood that H3N2v would spread to other pig holdings was judged to be high, assuming frequent movements of pigs between holdings. Currently, applied real time RT‐PCRs can detect all swine influenza A viruses and, combined with gene sequencing, would identify the emergence of H3N2v virus. However, sequencing is not done on a routine basis in EU. Experimental studies in pigs show that the infection is purely of respiratory nature and follows a relatively mild course with fever, coughing and inappetence, similar to that of the endemic swine influenza viruses. Immunity resulting from vaccination with European vaccines may provide some cross‐protection against infection with H3N2v virus whereas vaccines based on US swine H3N2 strains would offer superior protection. It is not possible to predict which changes within H3N2v virus might enable it to develop pandemic properties. Hence, it is not possible at present to set up a specific system to monitor such a risk. Nevertheless, it is recommended to reinforce the monitoring of influenza strains circulating in pigs in EU.

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Section: Origin and Characterisation Of H3n2v Virusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Emergence Of a New Pandemic Strain From H3n2vmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Scientific opinion on the possible risks posed by the influenza A (H3N2v) virus for animal health and its potential spread and implications for animal and human health

Authié¹,

Berg²,

Bøtner³

et al. 2013

EFS2

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The virus spread and rapidly achieved a prevalence of 15-20 % of swine influenza viruses isolated in Denmark (unpublished data). During the national passive surveillance programme in 2012, at least two new reassortants were detected in Danish pigs, one with seven segments derived from H1N1 and a N2 gene most closely related to that of a human seasonal H3N2 virus that was circulating in the mid-1990s (H1avN2hu) (Breum et al, 2013), and one containing seven segments from H1N1pdm09 and a N2 gene from H3N2 (H1pdmN2sw) (unpublished data), also detected in German pig populations (Starick et al, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Within the last few years, several new reassortant swine influenza viruses have been detected throughout Europe, Asia and the USA (Breum et al, 2013;Moreno et al, 2011;Pascua et al, 2013;Starick et al, 2011Starick et al, , 2012Tremblay et al, 2011), with many carrying segments from enzootic swine influenza viruses and the H1N1pdm09 virus.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

New reassortant and enzootic European swine influenza viruses transmit efficiently through direct contact in the ferret model

Fobian

Fabrizio

Yoon

et al. 2015

Journal of General Virology

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Prevalence of antibodies to European porcine influenza viruses in humans living in high pig density areas of Germany

Krumbholz

Lange

Dürrwald

et al. 2013

Med Microbiol Immunol

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The risk of zoonotic human infection caused by European porcine influenza virus strains was estimated in German regions with a high pig density. Sera from 622 healthy volunteers were collected between April 2009 and November 2011, mainly in Westphalia and western Lower Saxony. These included 362 subjects with occupational contact to pigs and 260 blood donors without any direct exposition to pigs. Samples were analysed by the haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay against a panel of six swine viruses of subtypes avian-like H1N1 and human-like H3N2 as well as against human H1N1 and H3N2 viruses including the pandemic H1N1 strain of 2009. Reciprocal HI titres ≥20 were quoted as seroreactive. Compared to the control group, a significantly higher proportion of subjects with direct contact to pigs exhibited seroreactivity against porcine antigens of the avian-like H1N1 (37.0 %/7.7 %), the human-like H3N2 (59.7 %/43.1 %), the pandemic H1N1 strain of 2009 (51.7 %/26.5 %) and against a historic seasonal H3N2 strain that is closely related antigenetically to currently circulating human-like H3N2 viruses of European pigs (57.5 %/36.5 %). This trend was also observed when a reciprocal HI titre ≥40 was chosen as cut-off. Particularly, in younger subjects, the differences in seroreactivity against porcine strains between the exposed and non-exposed group were significant. The data indicate a higher risk of infection in the exposed individuals.

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Reassortants of pandemic influenza A virus H1N1/2009 and endemic porcine HxN2 viruses emerge in swine populations in Germany

Cited by 38 publications

References 26 publications

Scientific opinion on the possible risks posed by the influenza A (H3N2v) virus for animal health and its potential spread and implications for animal and human health

Scientific opinion on the possible risks posed by the influenza A (H3N2v) virus for animal health and its potential spread and implications for animal and human health

New reassortant and enzootic European swine influenza viruses transmit efficiently through direct contact in the ferret model

Prevalence of antibodies to European porcine influenza viruses in humans living in high pig density areas of Germany

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