Recapturing Regime Type in International Relations: Leaders, Institutions, and Agency Space

Abstract

A wave of recent research challenges the role of regime type in international relations. One striking takeaway is that democratic and autocratic leaders can often achieve similar levels of domestic constraint, which in many issue areas results in similar international outcomes—leading many to question traditional views of democracies as distinctive in their international relations. In this review essay, we use recent contributions in the field to build what we call a “malleable constraints” framework, in which all governments have an institutionally defined default level of domestic audience constraint that is generally higher in democracies, but leaders maintain some agency within these institutions and can strategically increase their exposure to or insulation from this constraint. Using this framework, we argue that regime type is still a crucial differentiator in international affairs even if, as recent studies suggest, democratic and autocratic leaders can sometimes be similarly constrained by domestic audiences and thus achieve similar international outcomes. This framework helps reconcile many competing claims in recent scholarship, including the puzzle of why autocracies do not strategically increase domestic audience constraint more often. Just because autocracies can engage audience constraints and democracies can escape them does not mean that they can do so with equal ease, frequency, or risk.

Cui Bono? Business Elites and Interstate Conflict

“…In doing so, we propose that the ability of business elites to influence decisions of war and peace depends on whether or not they are part of a (autocratic or democratic) regime's support coalition. This aligns with insights linking decision-making and policy-outcomes not only to the interests of the principal leader but also the coalition that s/he relies upon to stay in power (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003;Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2012;Svolik, 2012;Weeks, 2014;Hyde and Saunders, 2020). Further, we highlight that the profit-motive of business elites may, especially depending on the economic situation of the "target country" in question, sometimes be a force for peace and at other times a force for war.…”

“…Explanations of war centering on domestic politics have a long tradition (see, e.g., Waltz, 1959;Levy and Thompson, 2011;Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2012). Key notions underpinning such theories are that executives are motivated by staying in office and that they -to varying degrees -are responsive to coalitions of societal actors that can have them removed (Hyde and Saunders, 2020). Chances of removal increase when leaders take actions that displease elites, for example not following up on explicit commitments to respond to foreign threats of military action, thus incurring "audience costs" (Fearon, 1994), or lose costly wars.…”

“…Variation in institutional constraints placed on leaders have recently been invoked to explain variation in conflict behavior also among dictatorships (Weeks, 2014(Weeks, , 2012Colgan and Weeks, 2015); constraints placed on leaders by alternative, power-balancing institutions, including capable legislatures or dominant regime parties, may influence even the belligerence of non-democracies. Hyde and Saunders (2020) synthesize arguments across different regime types, outlining a continuum of "domestic audience constraints" where both democracies and dictatorships vary in the degree to which leaders are curtailed.…”

“…For a recent synthesis, seeHyde and Saunders (2020).2 SeeVidal (2007). For an alternative explanation of the warDebs and Monteiro (c.f., 2014).…”

Domestic Politics, China's Rise, and the Future of the Liberal International Order

“…98. On the variety of constraints that leaders of different regime types face in foreign policy, see Hyde and Saunders 2020;Weeks 2008Weeks , 2012Weeks , 2014 99. Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988. In contrast, issues characterized by significant domestic divisions are challenging because some constituency will feel aggrieved that the government did not prioritize its interests.…”