Reciprocity—an indirect evolutionary analysis

Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Korth, Christian; Napel, Stefan

doi:10.1007/s00191-006-0053-1

Cited by 13 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Another modification is analysed in detail by Berninghaus et al . (2003) who replace purely outcome‐oriented concern for distributional equity by a preference for intention‐based reciprocal behaviour.…”

Section: Extensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games – An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis

Güth¹,

Napel²

2006

The Economic Journal

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The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward-looking evaluation of opportunities and adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behaviour, but long-run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only. This can justify intrinsic aversion to inequality in reward allocation games. Whereas earlier analysis was restricted to specific games, this article considers a more complex environment comprising different games whichstudied in isolation -yield opposite implications. Persistent divergence between intrinsic motivation and true material success is possible depending on the definition of inequality aversion as well as on agentsÕ ability to discriminate between games.* We gratefully acknowledge the constructive comments made by A. Poulsen and two anonymous referees. 1 For related studies see the contributions collected in the symposium in

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Section: Extensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games – An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis

Güth¹,

Napel²

2006

The Economic Journal

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“…The adaptive dynamics approach extends classification scheme for evolutionary stable strategies, and links the evolutionary models to replicator models. Many researchers study the evolution of specific preference, such as fairness [36,37,75], reciprocity [7,74], altruism [8,9,22,32,35], vengeance [26], and the conspicuous [24]. Recently, Li et al [47], Chen et al [14] analyze the effect of overconfidence on management strategy of firms.…”

Section: Caichun Chai Tiaojun Xiao and Eilin Francismentioning

confidence: 99%

Is social responsibility for firms competing on quantity evolutionary stable?

Chai¹,

Xiao²,

Francis³

2018

Journal of Industrial &Amp; Management Optimization

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This paper studies the evolutionary stable strategies and preferences regarding corporate social responsibility of competing firms. Firms randomly compete with each other in pairs. Shareholder-oriented firms have no social responsibility concern, whereas a firm that is concerned with social responsibility is stakeholder-oriented. Each firm first picks one of two production strategies: shareholder-oriented or stakeholder-oriented, and then decides production quantity. We find that socially responsible firms have lower retail prices. The evolutionary stability of a strategy depends on product substitutability and the degree to which firms care about social responsibility. When product substitutability is relatively high, stakeholder-oriented strategy is the evolutionary stable strategy; if product substitutability is lower than a threshold, shareholder-oriented strategy is evolutionary stable; and with moderate product substitutability, both strategies are evolutionary stable. Furthermore, we consider how the degree of social responsibility preference evolves according to the adaptive dynamics to continuously stable preference. We find that the non social responsibility concern behavior is not an evolutionary stable preference; there is a unique continuously stable degree of social responsibility preference. Furthermore, we find the evolutionary stability of shareholder-oriented and stakeholder-oriented depends on the initial distribution of firms' strategies under the continuously stable social responsibility preference.

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“…Thus, reciprocation is indirect, not mutual. [22] In this thesis, both Trading Paperclips and Distributed Barter-Based Directory Services scenarios follow a restricted exchange pattern. However, Bartering Networks scenario follow both exchange approaches.…”

Section: Barteringmentioning

confidence: 99%

Peer-to-Peer Bartering: Swapping Amongst Self-interested Agents

Cabanillas

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Large--scale distributed environments can be seen as a conflict between the selfish aims of the participants and the group welfare of the population as a whole. In order to regulate the behavior of the participants it is often necessary to introduce mechanisms that provide incentives and stimulate cooperative behavior in order to mitigate for the resultant potentially undesirable availability outcomes which could arise from individual actions. The history of economics contains a wide variety of incentive patterns for cooperation. In this thesis, we adopt bartering incentive pattern as an attractive foundation for a simple and robust form of exchange to re-allocate resources. While bartering is arguably the world's oldest form of trade, there are still many instances where it surprises us. The success and survivability of the barter mechanisms adds to its attractiveness as a model to study. In this thesis we have derived three relevant scenarios where a bartering approach is applied. Starting from a common model of bartering: - We show the price to be paid for dealing with selfish agents in a bartering environment, as well as the impact on performance parameters such as topology and disclosed information. - We show how agents, by means of bartering, can achieve gains in goods without altruistic agents needing to be present. - We apply a bartering--based approach to a real application, the directory services. The core of this research is the analysis of bartering in the Internet Age. In previous times, usually economies dominated by bartering have suffered from high transaction costs (i.e. the improbability of the wants, needs that cause a transaction occurring at the same time and place). Nowadays, the world has a global system of interconnected computer networks called Internet. This interconnected world has the ability to overcome many challenges of the previous times. This thesis analysis the oldest system of trade within the context of this new paradigm. In this thesis we aim is to show that bartering has a great potential, but there are many challenges that can affect the realistic application of bartering that should be studied. The purpose of this thesis has been to investigate resource allocation using bartering mechanism, with particular emphasis on applications in largescale distributed systems without the presence of altruistic participants in the environment. Throughout the research presented in this thesis we have contributed evidence that supports the leitmotif that best summarizes our work: investigation interactions amongst selfish, rational, and autonomous agents with incomplete information, each seeking to maximize its expected utility by means of bartering. We concentrate on three scenarios: one theoretical, a case of use, and finally a real application. All of these scenarios are used for evaluating bartering. Each scenario starts from a common origin, but each of them have their own unique features. The final conclusion is that bartering is still relevant in the modern world.

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Reciprocity—an indirect evolutionary analysis

Cited by 13 publications

References 34 publications

Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games – An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis

Inequality Aversion in a Variety of Games – An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis

Is social responsibility for firms competing on quantity evolutionary stable?

Peer-to-Peer Bartering: Swapping Amongst Self-interested Agents

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