Reciprocity and Workers’ Tastes for Representation

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research at DIW BerlinThis series presents research findings based either directly on data from the German SocioEconomic Panel Study (SOEP) or using SOEP data as part of an internationally comparable data set (e.g. CNEF, ECHP, LIS, LWS, CHER/PACO). SOEP is a truly multidisciplinary household panel study covering a wide range of social and behavioral sciences: economics, sociology, psychology, survey methodology, econometrics and applied statistics, educational science, political science, public health, behavioral genetics, demography, geography, and sport science.The decision to publish a submission in SOEPpapers is made by a board of editors chosen by the DIW Berlin to represent the wide range of disciplines covered by SOEP. There is no external referee process and papers are either accepted or rejected without revision. Papers appear in this series as works in progress and may also appear elsewhere. They often represent preliminary studies and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be requested from the author directly.Any opinions expressed in this series are those of the author(s) and not those of DIW Berlin.Research disseminated by DIW Berlin may include views on public policy issues, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. Abstract: Using unique survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, this study examines the influence of reciprocal inclinations on workers' sorting into codetermined firms. Employees with strong negative reciprocal inclinations are more likely to work in firms with a works council while employees with strong positive reciprocal inclinations are less likely to work in such firms. We argue that these findings conform to hypotheses derived from the experimental literature. Moreover, the results show striking gender differences in the relationship between reciprocity and taste for representation. These differences can be partially explained by gender-specific differences in the average degree of labor force attachment.JEL: D03, J52, J53, M50.

Owner‐Managers and the Failure of Newly Adopted Works Councils

“…These unobserved factors can result in an omitted variable bias. For example, findings by Jirjahn and Lange () indicate that workers with specific personality traits such as positive reciprocal inclinations sort away from co‐determined firms as they prefer more personal and informal relationships with their employer. To the extent these workers self‐select in owner‐managed firms, it may be not the owner‐managers but rather the workers themselves who oppose co‐determination.…”

The contributions of behavioural economics to understanding and advancing the sustainability of worker cooperatives

“…This is valuable for cooperatives, given our argument in section 4 that inequality aversion is a good motivator of mutual monitoring. related to this, Jirjahn and Lange (2012), using questionnaires related to the attraction of students to working in a firm with a works council, find that negative reciprocators (the type of reciprocity in which unkind acts from others get punished) are attracted to firms with worker participation in decision-making, because they enjoy punishing. This is not theoretically guaranteed, because negative reciprocity can merely serve to evade a psychic loss (rather than generate pleasure); in conventional firms, the lack of profit-sharing may leave workers immune to slacking by co-workers.…”