Recognition, Authority Relations, and Rejecting Hate Speech

Abstract

A key focus in many debates surrounding the harm in hate speech centres on the immediate subordinating impact hate speech has on its victims. Under such a view, and provided there exists a requisite level of speaker authority a particular speech situation, hate speech can be conceived as a direct act of subordination, rather than as the mere expression of hateful ideas. Missing from these conceptions, however, are the ways in which intersubjective, recognition-sensitive relations influence the kind of harm likely to result from such an act. This paper aims to fill this theoretical gap, through examining the ways in which victims recognize the normative authority of hate-speakers to make claims upon them. As I contend here, understanding the recognitive nature of such acts helps to explain those cases in which hate speech fails to deliver the status-ordering intentions of the speaker. Utilizing this enhanced understanding, I reflect upon one particular real-world example of hate speech, in which the target rejects the status-ordering claims made upon her. In the last section, I propose a general institutional outlook aimed towards aiding would-be victims of hate speech to respond to such attempts at normative authority exertion.

Hate Speech and Authentic Personhood: Unveiling the Truth

“…Elegant as Waldron's thesis might be, his harm theory of hate speech has been criticized for not being clear on whether hate speech is a causal factor for harm, or constitutes harm by its very nature (cf., Barendt, 2019b). Whitten (2019) also has his reservations about the harm theory of speech in general. He argues that what is missing from the varied harm-oriented conceptions of hate speech are the ways in which intersubjective, recognition-sensitive relations influence the kind of harm likely to result from such an act.…”