One particularly prominent strand of hate speech theory conceptualizes the harm in hate speech by considering the immediate illocutionary force of a hate speech 'act'. What appears to be missing from such a conception, however, is how recognition relations and normative expectations present in a speech situation influence the harm such speech causes to its victims. Utilizing a particular real-world example, this paper illustrates how these defining background conditions and intersubjective relations influence the harm of hate speech as it is experienced from the first-person perspective. This, more nuanced conception of harm, takes note of the effects such speech inflicts on an individual's recognitive status, and can provide a clearer understanding of the conditions necessary for an act of hate speech to cause the speaker's desired effect on their targets.

A key focus in many debates surrounding the harm in hate speech centres on the immediate subordinating impact hate speech has on its victims. Under such a view, and provided there exists a requisite level of speaker authority a particular speech situation, hate speech can be conceived as a direct act of subordination, rather than as the mere expression of hateful ideas. Missing from these conceptions, however, are the ways in which intersubjective, recognition-sensitive relations influence the kind of harm likely to result from such an act. This paper aims to fill this theoretical gap, through examining the ways in which victims recognize the normative authority of hate-speakers to make claims upon them. As I contend here, understanding the recognitive nature of such acts helps to explain those cases in which hate speech fails to deliver the status-ordering intentions of the speaker. Utilizing this enhanced understanding, I reflect upon one particular real-world example of hate speech, in which the target rejects the status-ordering claims made upon her. In the last section, I propose a general institutional outlook aimed towards aiding would-be victims of hate speech to respond to such attempts at normative authority exertion.

Abstract‘Counterspeech’ is often presented as a way in which individual citizens can respond to harmful speech while avoiding the potentially coercive and freedom-damaging effects of formal speech restrictions. But counterspeech itself can also undermine freedom by contributing to forms of social punishment that manipulate a speaker’s choice set in uncontrolled ways. Specifically, and by adopting a republican perspective, this paper argues that certain kinds of counterspeech can dominate when they contribute to unchecked social norms that enable others to interfere arbitrarily with speakers. The presence of such domination can pose just as much a threat to freedom of speech as unchecked formal restrictions by threatening an individual’s discursive status, revealing a problem for those who defend counterspeech as a freedom-protecting alternative. Rather than rejecting both counterspeech and legislation outright, however, this paper argues that the republican principle of parsimony ought to be exercised when deciding on appropriate harmful speech response. While the principle of parsimony allows for suitably-checked formal punishment for some of the most egregious forms of harmful speech, citizen-led counterspeech must be guided by a reliable set of norms against the use of social punishment where those who do engage in social punishment face certain costs. The presence of robust, widely-known, and reliable norms thus supports both formal and informal responses to harmful speech while maintaining a secure discursive status for all.

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